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Introduction
Political economy was certainly one of the most active ￿elds in economics in the last
30 years. Fiscal Policies, monetary policies and regulatory policies seemed to be very
di⁄erent in the reality from what the well founded theories of public ￿nance suggested.
Was this due to a lack of interest of policymakers and their consultants or were there
systematic reasons why economic policy fell short of following the guidelines of eco-
nomic theory? Political economy opted for the second type of answers and was indeed
successful in delivering them. Assuming individual utility maximization of politicians
led us to a lot of new insights. Theoretical models showed not only that rational in-
dividual welfare maximizing politicians will induce allocations that look di⁄erent from
the ￿rst best solutions of economic theory, but also identi￿ed the underlying reasons.
A lot of the ine¢ ciencies could be traced back to various forms of imperfections in
the political process and a lot of the traditional insights on the optimal division of
labor between public and private sectors were challenged. In short, political economy
formalized the political constraints of real world economic policy and showed what
allocations one can expect from economic policy in the reality.
From its very beginnings, the formal and informal literature of political economy
was concerned with questions that arise in open economies like the high level of ob-
served custom taxes or excessive (foreign) borrowing. Still, most models of political
economy deal with closed economy models. Beyond any doubt, these models provided
us with a lot of understanding about the political frictions economic policy has to
face. However, it is also true that many economic policies can only be fully understood
in an international context. Not only are some policy issues by their mere existence
international phenomena - like sovereign debt - but also get a lot of economic policy
interventions a more and more international dimension that increases with countriesIntroduction 2
integration into international ￿nancial, goods and factor markets. Certainly, tax or
regulatory policies can be understood in closed economy models, but at the same time
it is true that the degree of openness of an economy matters for the normative design
or positive results of such policies.
Political economy in open economies is distinct from political economy in closed
economies for a variety of reasons. First and foremost, goods, capital and other factors
of production have the possibility to cross borders. This has to be taken into account
by rational politicians as the mobility of factors and goods reduces the set of allocations
that are feasible to him. Secondly, politicians do not necessarily take into account the
e⁄ect of their policies on the citizens of other countries, although they might have an
impact on the allocation there. The literature on international economics has been
very well aware of this inter country external e⁄ect. We will present two models in this
dissertation where we can show that domestic political frictions can attenuate this inter
country external e⁄ect. Finally, foreigners in turn will have an impact on the domestic
allocation as well. We show in one model that this gives rises a further dimension
to the credibility and commitment problems of the chosen policy. In this context, we
make the point that the engagement in domestic political competition might serve as
a commitment device towards foreigners.
Therefore, in part I of this dissertation we want to present two models of non-
welfare maximizing politicians that are explicitly set in open economies. In part II, we
certainly stay in the ￿eld of political economy, but deal with redistributive con￿ icts on
a more abstract level.
In CHAPTER 2, we give a selective review on the literature on international policy
interdependence. Most literature reviews on policy interdependence tend to focus on
one special policy area like monetary policy, tax policy or trade policy. We want to look
at the interdependence from a political economy point of view, that is we want to stress
the impact of non-cooperative policy making, reelection seeking politicians, partisan
politics and policy credibility. Indeed, we can show that these issue are present in all
the di⁄erent strands of literature. Therefore it is worth looking at them simultaneously
in a separate chapter.
CHAPTER 3 presents a model of sovereign debt. Sovereign Debt is per de￿ni-
tionem a topic of international economics as it describes government debt that is held
by foreigners. As sovereign governments cannot be forced to repay their debts in any
way comparable to private borrowers, economists asked which mechanisms can sustain
repayment in equilibrium. Whereas the existing literature is only able to show thatIntroduction 3
sovereign debt is sustainable, if foreigners can credibly threat to exclude a default-
ing economy from future borrowing or enforce trade sanctions, we show that there is
another mechanism that can sustain sovereign debt in equilibrium, it is simply the in-
terest of domestic bondholders to get repaid. Further, the existing literature frequently
points out that the ultimate decision of a sovereign whether to repay or not is a po-
litical one. Nevertheless, there are only a few contributions so far that try to model
this political decision explicitly. We take a new approach to the subject in a model
in which the sovereign government is engaged in domestic political competition and
derive its decision endogenously from its desire to get reelected. Furthermore, we allow
for debt to be held by domestic and foreign residents simultaneously. Finally, we derive
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium that can explain repayment and non-repayment as equi-
librium phenomena depending on the realization of exogenous parameters. While this
in itself is certainly a new feature, we can also show that it matters crucially to focus
on a re-election seeking politician as he is a be to solve the time inconsistency prob-
lem of sovereign debt under appropriate conditions. Whereas a social planner of the
domestic economy will never repay, given that no selective default and no punishment
against him are possible, a reelection seeking politician will repay under appropriate
circumstances. Put di⁄erently, we can show that the switch from a welfare maximiz-
ing politician to a re-election seeking politician implies not only a marginal change in
the resulting allocation, but we might arrive in a completely di⁄erent allocation. The
engagement in domestic political competition serves as a commitment device towards
foreigners, although foreigners obviously have no possibility to in￿ uence the domestic
political process. In particular, we can show that sovereign debt is feasible in equilib-
rium, even if foreigners have no possibilities to punish a defaulting government as they
can implicitly delegate this punishment mechanism to domestic voters. The model
therefore identi￿es a new mechanism that can sustain sovereign debt in equilibrium: it
is simply domestic creditor￿ s interest to get repaid.
CHAPTER 4 deals with intellectual property rights - a topic that has received a
heightened attention in recent years in political debates as well as in the academic
literature on international trade. It is reasonably well understood how patent lengths
in￿ uence economic activity in a closed economy. There are however no papers that take
explicitly a political economy approach to an open economy. This is surprising as the
protection of intellectual property rights turned out to be one of the most controversial
subjects in the world trading system. On the one hand northern countries claim that
there is insu¢ cient protection of intellectual property rights in developing countries,
developing countries point out to the high social and monetary cost of enforcing higherIntroduction 4
intellectual property rights standards in their economies. Therefore, we develop a
simple model with two countries (that can be taken as North and South) and allow for
politicians that can be biased in favor of consumers or producers. In the context of this
model, we explore under which conditions there is insu¢ cient protection of intellectual
property rights in a global economy and how the characteristics of politicians or the
sizes of the countries will a⁄ect it. We can identify two frictions in policymaking: on the
one hand politicians do not take into account the e⁄ect of their policies on the welfare of
foreigners ( inter country e⁄ect), on the other hand they can be biased towards certain
domestic groups (political friction). We derive the welfare maximizing allocation in a
closed and in an open economy and compare it to the Nash equilibrium that will result
from the interaction of politicians. While it is a robust ￿nding for the closed economy
that a biased politician cannot do better than a welfare maximizing politician by the
mere de￿nition of the terms, we show that he can indeed increase global welfare, but
does so at the expense of domestic consumers. Although the literature on international
trade has been recognizing the impact of this inter country friction for a long time,
we can show that the interaction of both frictions gives rise to an interesting result:
they tend to o⁄set each other. In contrast to the previous chapter, where we analyzed
the incentives of a reelection seeking politician, in this chapter we look at a politician
that is biased towards a lobbying group. Further, we can substantiate the claim, that
non-cooperative policy making in intellectual property rights protection will always
lead to an insu¢ cient protection of intellectual property rights.
In CHAPTER 5 we turn our attention to questions of economic governance. One
of the oldest concepts in the ￿eld of political economy is rent seeking. Wherever there
is a return above the market return to be gained, one should expect rational economic
agents to spend resources in order to obtain this rent. We brie￿ y discuss the concept
of rent seeking and compare it to other models of special interest group politics. After
having discussed some e⁄ects of strategic delegation (which is based on joint work
with Florian Englmaier), we turn to the costs of rent seeking. This discussion leads us
straightforward to the last model.
Consequently, in the last CHAPTER 6 we take a new perspective on rent seeking
contests. Whereas it is a general and quite robust result in the literature on rent seeking
contests that the contest will be more wasteful, the more players are involved, we show
that this result is only true as long as one views the contest in isolation. As soon as
one looks at the contest as a subgame of a larger game in which contestants have the
possibility to control the creation of the rent, this result is overturned: more anticipated
competition leads to less rent seeking activities in the subgame perfect equilibrium.Introduction 5
The model provides a simple speci￿cation of a political process where voters elect a
politician, a politician can set the size of a rent and voters ￿nally decide whether
to engage in rent seeking activities. We abstract from all institutional details of the
political details and ask what characteristics of a population will make the emergence
of rent seeking activities likely in an economy. We show that electoral accountability
provides indeed incentives to reduce the amount of rent seeking activities undertaken
in an economy. Finally, we overturn the common sense argument that more fragmented
societies will experience less clean governance structures, and show that a high degree
of fragmentation or asymmetry can indeed reduce the amount of rent seeking activities
we observe in an economy.Part I
Political Economy in Open
EconomiesChapter 2
National Policies in International
Markets
2.1 Policy Interdependence
There has been probably no other economic development in the last decades that at-
tracted as much attention as the so called globalization. Although di⁄erent authors
refer to di⁄erent phenomena and concepts when they use this term, there can be little
doubt that markets currently enjoy an historically unprecedented level of openness.1
Beyond any doubt, ￿nancial and good markets are more open today than they used
to be ever before. The ratio of foreign trade to GDP has been rising continuously
for almost all nations in the last decades. Financial cross-border transactions have
been growing even faster. No market, however, operates without a political framework
and political interventions. Still, political interventions are undertaken by national
governments most of the time. So, despite all the integration, the rules under which
markets operate nationally and internationally are still decided upon by national gov-
ernments. Certainly, international and intergovernmental organizations grew in scope
and importance as well in the last decades. But still, sovereign states decide about na-
tional economic policies or decide whether to accept internationally agreed upon norms.
Some of the most important policy areas like ￿scal policy are almost exclusively un-
dertaken by national policymakers. Certainly, a lot of countries try to set norms that
are bilaterally valid, in some areas sovereign countries even try to set norms that have
a global impact like the world trading system, the world intellectual property rights
organization and many more. But still, in order for them to become valid, they have
1For a historical analysis and critical discussion of this issue see Baldwin and Martin (1999).National Policies and International Markets 8
to get accepted and rati￿ed by national governments or parliaments.
What does this imply for economic policymaking? First of all, it means that eco-
nomic policy has to deal with markets that are open in many ways. A change on a
domestic market can lead to a di⁄erent allocation on a foreign market, that will in-
￿ uence again the domestic allocation. The normative design and positive outcome of
economic policies look quite di⁄erent in open and in closed economies.2 Second, if we
try to model the outcome of the domestic policy game, we have to take into account
that there are more actors than national governments and national economic agents.
There are circumstances - as those described in Chapter 3 - where national policymak-
ers have to take into account the reactions of foreign investors or consumers as well.
Thirdly, several governments might have to make similar decisions at the same time.
If each government knows that its own optimal decision has an impact on the optimal
decision of the other governments and vice versa, then we can describe this situation
of mutual interdependence as a game. Indeed, Chapter 4 will present a model with
this structure. Finally, not only domestic but also international institutions can have
an impact on the allocation.
Since the ￿rst two models in this dissertation deal with political decisions in open
economies, we want to give a brief overview on the political economy literature on
economic policies in open economies. This literature is large as it covers an array
of topics such di⁄erent as monetary policy, ￿scal policy, trade policy and regulatory
policy. We do not want to go into the details of each policy literature, but rather focus
on some recurrent topics in this literature, such as: When is international cooperation
welfare improving? Can the engagement in political competition make policies more
credible? Will voters always bene￿t from the cooperation of politicians or can this
cooperation be to their disadvantage? How can international organizations help to
enforce cooperative outcomes?
The rest of this introductory chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2 we
look upon countries the are interdependent by some market mechanisms while policies
are still chosen nationally. We ask under which circumstances cooperation of welfare
maximizing politicians is welfare improving and brie￿ y discuss the limitations of this
approach
Then, we look at issues of time consistency and credibility in open economies in 2.3.
2Gordon and Hines (2002) for example observe: "The nature of optimal tax policy depends criti-
cally on whether the economy is open or closed: The importance of this distinction is evident imme-
diately from the di⁄erence that economic openness makes for tax incidence."National Policies and International Markets 9
We show how the engagement in international competition can serve as a commitment
device as it can give additional credibility to chosen policies.
In section 2.4 we discuss some models of partisan policymakers and show that in
the presence of partisan policymakers coordination can not only be unfruitful, but
also counterproductive. If politicians have di⁄erent objectives than their voters, in-
ternational cooperation can be a means of collusion by present governments against
future governments or present voters. It will turn out that international competition
might put an additional incentive constraint on the politicians and these additional
constraints can increase welfare.
Finally, in 2.5 and 2.6 we recognize that international policy cooperation takes place
in an institutional setting. We discuss how domestic and international institutions can
in￿ uence the strategic situation and the resulting allocation.
2.2 International Cooperation and Welfare Maxi-
mizing Politicians
Hamada (1976) was the ￿rst one to explore spillovers in monetary policy and monetary
authorities that are aware of this spillover e⁄ect. That is, he looked at international
monetary policy as a strategic situation. Although he did not take into account rational
expectations and the involved issues of time consistency of the optimal monetary policy,
he applied the tools of modern game theory in his study. Hamada looked at two
countries that are hit by a supply shock simultaneously. The optimal response of
each monetary authority to a negative supply shock is to increase the money supply,
which stabilizes output, but increases in￿ ation. This in￿ ation in turn leads to a real
appreciation of the exchange rate because of the higher domestic price level, which
will have a negative e⁄ect on exports and therefore on the domestic output level. This
implies that the optimal response of the monetary authority in the open economy is to
accommodate the supply side shock less than in a closed economy.
Hamada then asks whether one can improve on this uncoordinated Nash equilib-
rium and he can show indeed that there is a whole set of domestic and foreign money
supplies that lead for both countries to a higher welfare. A subset of this set ful￿lls
the e¢ ciency condition and can be interpreted as a contract curve. Although, one
cannot determine without further assumptions, which point will be chosen, coopera-National Policies and International Markets 10
tion can unambiguously lead to a Pareto-improvement. The economic reason for this
improvement lies in the fact that both countries are assured that the other country
expands money supply further than in the non-cooperative regime, which will o⁄set
the negative impact of the exchange rate on output.
Although the application of simple game theory predicts that one can gain in terms
of welfare by moving from the noncooperative to the cooperative equilibrium, a vivid
discussion followed Hamada￿ s seminal contribution. Generically, the cooperative equi-
librium has the property to be instable as each country has unilaterally an incentive
to defect. If this strategic situation occurs frequently, one might interpret it as a re-
peated game. In this case reputational considerations or trigger strategies can sustain
the cooperative outcome.3 As a country is sovereign, there are no means to punish
the defection readily. However, it might be that countries can commit themselves to
a certain degree by joining international organizations.4 This in turn can explain why
international policy cooperation is not done on a bilateral or multilateral basis in most
cases, but rather delegated to international institutions.5
A rich empirical literature has tried to quantify the gains of international coopera-
tion, if all relevant actors agree on the true model of the world. The pioneering work
by Sachs and Oudiz (1988) showed indeed that there are signi￿cantly positive gains
from international cooperation, but that they are likely to be relatively small. How-
ever, one cannot be assured that policymakers know the correct model on the world
and are able to agree on it. Frankel and Rockett (1988) explore this issue in a two
country setting (EU and US). They restrict the uncertainty to one model parameter
and show that, even if politicians agree on a cooperative policymaking and truly be-
lieve that this will lead to welfare gains for their country, this is only true in roughly
half of all cases. In the other half of all possible cases this cooperation will lead to a
welfare loss. Of course, if politicians do not even maximize welfare or face credibility
problems, this can aggravate the problem further. We will discuss these issues in the
following paragraphs. Still, taking policymakers as national welfare maximizers can
provide insights, but one must take into account the methodological limitations of this
approach or as Frey (1996) summarizes these criticisms:"[...] most studies [...] assume
nations to be the relevant actors. Such a view is useful for some types of analyses, but
it is inconsistent with the basic tenet of economics. Only individuals act in accordance
3For a detailled discussion, see Canzoneri and Henderson(1992) pp. 81-134
4See Staiger (1995) for a detailed examination of this argument.
5This idea was originally developped by Buchanan and Faith(1987). Chari and Kehoe( provide a
more formal discussion on what can be achieved by international coopertaion, depending on whether
side payments are possible or not.National Policies and International Markets 11
with their preferences and constraints. Nations do not have preferences nor do they
respond to incentives in a way comparable to individuals."
2.3 Time Consistency and Credibility: International
Competition as a Commitment Device
That welfare maximizing politicians can do better by cooperating should not come as
a surprise in static games. But what happens, if politicians are not the only actors?
What if they interact with a private sector that consists of rational economic agents as
well? As Lucas (1976) famously demonstrated, if one takes the rationality paradigm
seriously, one cannot model voters as passive agents with adaptive expectations, but
must take into account that they form expectations rationally and in particular that
they condition their expectations on politicians￿behavior. This perspective leads to
a new interpretation of economic policy as optimal economic policy has to satisfy an
additional condition in order to be viable, it has to be time consistent. Most dynamic
economic policies involve issues of time consistency. Once a private sector has formed
expectations about the future in￿ ation rate, monetary authorities have an incentive
to create surprise in￿ ation in order to boost output.6 Another famous example from
￿scal policy is capital taxation. Ex-ante politicians have incentives to promise low tax
rates in order to stimulate investment. Once the capital is installed it has an elasticity
of zero and should be taxed highly according to the principles of optimal taxation.
We want to discuss brie￿ y the structure of the time consistency problem in open
economies. We do so in a famous example of capital tax competition and policy
credibility. If capital is mobile between sovereign states and each country tries to
maximize its ￿scal revenue, the Nash equilibrium in taxes between this governments
implies an undertaxation of capital. The reason for this result is that each country has
an incentive to cut its own tax rate and thereby to attract foreign capital. Depending
on the costs of capital mobility, the Nash equilibrium can go as far as zero tax on the
mobile factor.
On the other hand, there is a time inconsistency problem in capital taxation. Ex-
ante politician￿ s have an incentive to promise low taxes in order to induce consumers to
6This idea was brought up by Kydland and Prsecott (1977) and furthr explored by Barro and
Gordon (1983).National Policies and International Markets 12
save or to attract foreign capital. Once the capital is in place, even a welfare maximizing
government tends to overtax capital. The reason can be understood with the help of
the Ramsey rule on optimal taxation. Installed capital has a low elasticity, therefore
it should be taxed heavily. Rational consumers anticipate that the government has
an incentive to overtax installed capital and will therefore accumulate less capital, this
leads to an equilibrium where social welfare will be less than in an equilibrium in which
the government has the possibility to commit itself to future tax rates.7
Will the credibility problem be worsened or attenuated in an open economy? Ke-
hoe (1989) shows that openness of the capital market can improve welfare, if there is a
credibility problem of the policymaker. The reason is that the engagement in an inter-
national competition for mobile capital can serve as a commitment device in itself not
to overtax capital. This result stands in stark contrast to models of tax competition,
which show that competition for mobile factors might be worse than a situation in
which one could suppress this competition. In particular, Kehoe looks at a two coun-
try model with three periods. First, consumers have to decide on how much capital
to accumulate, then governments announce their tax rates, ￿nally consumers decide
on where to invest. If capital is immobile, one arrives at the classical overtaxation
result: once the capital is in place, there is an incentive to overtax it. This is rationally
anticipated by consumers in the ￿rst period and leads to a distorted decision of con-
sumers in that period. It is important to keep in mind that it is indeed rational forward
looking behavior of consumers that leads to this distortion because they understand
the incentives of governments to overtax capital.
If capital is mobile between economies, this forces governments in competition to
attract capital by setting a low tax rate. This competition prevents governments from
overtaxation. If one wants to make exact welfare comparisons, one has to specify the
mobility costs, but Kehoe is able to show that there are reasonable cost functions for
which the competition equilibrium results in a higher welfare. The important point
is that there are two forces that pull taxes away from there optimal level. On the
one hand, there is the e⁄ect of international competition which pulls down tax rates
from their optimal level; on the other hand there is politician￿ s credibility problem that
tends to push taxes up relative to the optimal level. As these forces go into opposite
directions, both frictions may o⁄set each other - an idea that will play an important
role in the models of the following two chapters.
7There is an equally impressive literature on how this time inconsistency problem can be solved.
Person and Tabellini (1994), for example, suggest strategic delegation to a wealthy politician.National Policies and International Markets 13
Finally, one can ask what this implies for international cooperation. One sees that
it is not sure whether international cooperation is desirable in this setting. If politicians
can coordinate on the tax rates, they e⁄ectively can suppress the competition in the
tax rates between them. This will eliminate the force that was working against the
upward distortion of the taxes that is caused by the credibility problem. While models
that look at policy cooperation in a purely static setting predict that cooperation can
only be welfare improving (as one can always coordinate on the non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium), this must no longer be true if we recognize that governments are not the
only relevant actors, but economic decisions are also undertaken by consumers and in
the interaction with them. Put di⁄erently, cooperation among governments implies
that only a subcoalition of all actors forms a joint coalition. We know from coalition
theory, that a subcoalition that tries to improve its welfare might well end up in a
situation where it reduced welfare
2.4 Biased Politicians: Cooperation as a Means of
Collusion
So far, we were considering politicians that tried to maximize social welfare of their
own economy, but did not take into account the e⁄ects their policy choices have on
foreigners. This gave rise to an inter-country friction. Political economy is also con-
cerned with the positive outcomes of economic policy, if a politicians are not interested
in maximizing social welfare, but have their own agenda, which can include reelection,
rent appropriation in o¢ ce or catering to special interest groups. If we look at politi-
cians that maximize something di⁄erent than social welfare, we add a political friction
as well. A priori, we have no idea whether these frictions will amplify, attenuate or
even eliminate each other. In the following chapters, we will present two models that
show how the political and the inter-country friction can indeed attenuate each other.
Still, in this paragraph, we want to have a look on the literature on international
policymaking with non-welfare maximizing politicians.
Vaubel (1985) was the ￿rst one to make the point that policy cooperation might be
undesirable if politicians have di⁄erent objectives than their voters. Without making
reference to a special model, he states that policy cooperation can be used as a means
to collude against voters. In this case, international competition might be desirable
as it can make partisan politics more expensive. Reconsider the example of monetaryNational Policies and International Markets 14
authorities that have an incentive to create surprise in￿ ation. If politicians are in an
open economy, this will not only boost output, but also increase the price level which
in turn will lead to an appreciation of the currency and ￿nally reduce exports and
thereby output. It is exactly this negative e⁄ect in the open economy that will make
it more costly for monetary authorities to increase output by surprise in￿ ation. If one
allows politicians to cooperate, they can suppress this negative e⁄ect. If both monetary
authorities expand money supply at the same time, they eliminate this negative e⁄ect
of the exchange rate and create an even higher in￿ ation. 8
Cooperation might not only serve as a means to collude against voters, it can also
be used as a means to collude against future governments. Alesina and Tabellini (1990)
put forward the idea that political instability can lead to an overaccumulation of public
debt. If the current government is unsure about whether it will get reelected, it has an
incentive to overaccumulate debt. As it knows that the future government with di⁄erent
preferences on public spending, will spend the ￿scal revenues on di⁄erent types of public
goods, the present government has an incentive to transfer future tax revenues into the
present by the accumulation debt. This happens because the present government can
set the use of the present public spending. Tabellini (1990) considers this idea in an
open economy and comes up with a similar conclusion upon the desirability of policy
cooperation: the noncooperative equilibrium might well imply a higher welfare than the
cooperative one. As the expansion of public spending leads to an appreciation of the
exchange rate and thereby to a decrease in exports, this will have a negative second
order e⁄ect on output. If politician￿ s can cooperate, they can accumulate debt and
expand output at the same time. Therefore, they can eliminate this negative second
order e⁄ect of the exchange rate appreciation.
Note the similarities between both arguments. Although politicians do not care
about the exchange rate in itself, it will be in￿ uenced by their policy. The exchange
rate again has an e⁄ect on the output variable, politicians originally tried to target. As
both politician￿ s had similar objectives, but objectives that were di⁄erent from their
voters￿objectives, cooperation was used as a means to collude against them.
A necessary condition for the undesirability of international cooperation is that
politicians have objectives that are su¢ ciently di⁄erent from welfare maximization.
Although Tabellini provides microfoundations for the politician￿ s behavior, there re-
mains some arbitrariness in the speci￿cation of the politician￿ s objective functions. The
8Lohmann(1994) makes a related argument for political business cycles.National Policies and International Markets 15
objective functions are important as they are decisive on whether cooperation is desir-
able or undesirable. To make this argument in terms of the above mentioned model let
us consider a politician that has preferences over public spending and domestic output.
One can show in the framework of Tabellini￿ s model that the negative e⁄ect of coop-
eration depends crucially on the weight politicians put on output and public spending.
In particular, the negative e⁄ect of international cooperation decreases in the weight
the politician puts on output ( as opposed to the composition of public spending) and
￿nally disappears if the politician only cares about output.
2.5 Enforcement and Institutions: The Role of In-
ternational Organizations
Although we discussed in the previous sections that there might be circumstances
under which international cooperation of economic policies can be desirable, we only
mentioned the related issues of enforcement in passing. In most cooperative solutions
players have an incentive to deviate from the cooperative outcome unilaterally. In
other words, the cooperative outcome tends to be inherently unstable. Furthermore,
we can observe that most policy coordination is not undertaken by bilateral or multi-
lateral agreements, but rather takes place under the auspices of international organi-
zations. Does the presence of international organizations alter the strategic situation
between countries fundamentally? Can international organizations help to coordinate
on cooperative outcomes that would not have been possible otherwise? The impact of
international organizations seems to be considerable.
Indeed, there is a large literature that tries to identify how the voting mechanisms
and ￿nancing structures of international organizations shape their policymaking. Frey
(1996) for example observes that many international organizations like the United Na-
tions have some few main contributors to their budget, but an equal voting when it
comes to policy issues. Naturally, this gives small contributors to the budget a high
incentive to vote for an increase in expenditures as they pay only a small fraction of
the expenditure raise. We want to structure our brief discussion around two questions:
Can international organizations help the to coordinate the economic policies of coun-
tries towards a favorable outcome and under which conditions are they able to do so?
Does the presence of international organizations alter the structure of policymaking in
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Staiger (1995) discusses the issue in the context of the World Trade Organization.
In particular, he asks why there is a World Trade Organization at all and if it has
any power in a world of sovereign sates. He is able to show that there is indeed a
di⁄erence between multilateral trade negotiations and an institutionalized procedure
as the World Trade Organization. Staiger looks at a world of imperfect information
where it is costly to verify, if a state broke a previously negotiated agreement. In
this case, there is a free rider problem as each individual country has an incentive not
to carry out the investigations to check if this has happened. Further an individual
country might come under pressure, if it acts against another, in particular, if a small
country acts against a bigger one. Delegating this monitoring to a central authority
can overcome this free rider problem under a proper institutional design.9
Certainly, this raises the question whether the presence and power of international
organizations violates the national sovereignty. Certainly, if states sign a treaty that
obliges them to follow certain rules, this limits the scope of national economic policy.
Bagwell and Staiger (2004) show under which conditions there is a trade-o⁄ between
national sovereignty and international e¢ ciency. In an abstract setting, they are able
to show that a careful institutional design can eliminate this tension in the area of
trade policy, because of the overall win-win nature of trade liberalizations. Although
Stagier does not make an explicit reference to other policy areas, one can see that in
the case of monetary policy there is indeed a trade-o⁄between national sovereignty and
international e¢ ciency. This discussion conjured up a rich literature on the European
monetary integration. 10Although most authors do not explicitly speak of a trade- o⁄
between economic e¢ ciency and national sovereignty, they point out to political factors
that shape the institutional development. 11
So, if there is a literature that models how international institutions and agreements
are shaped by national political objectives or constraints, one can indeed turn around
and ask whether there is also a causality the other way, namely, if international insti-
tutions alter national policies as well. There is a rich, but rather descriptive literature
9From a contract theoretical perspective, it is not clear at all that the central authority will have
incentives to monitor compliance and enforce punishments, even if it has a comparative advantage to
do so.
10There is in particular a rich literature that looks at the political determinants of the European
monetary integration. Seminal contributions include Alesina and Grilli (1992) and Eichengreen and
Frieden (1994).
11It might be a valid assumption in a purely macroeconomic analysis to identify political factors
as an exogenous constraint or policy goal. If we take on a true political economy approach however,
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in political science that explores these questions.12 The political economy literature on
that issue is rather descriptive. Dreher (2003, 2004) shows that International Monetary
Fund lending in￿ uences ￿scal and monetary policy of recipient countries, in another
contribution he asks whether International Monetary Fund involvement in a country
changes its political structure signi￿cantly ( as measured by an index of economic
freedom). Svensson (1999) and Drazen (1999) show in theoretical contributions that
donations by international organizations or foreign donors can induce rent seeking be-
havior in recipient countries and decrease welfare. Casella and Eichengreen (1996)
identify conditions under which foreign aid can delay necessary policy reforms even
further. They apply a war of attrition model to support their claim.
To sum it up, there is not only evidence on policy interdependence between coun-
tries, there are also interdependencies between countries and international organiza-
tions. We brie￿ y sketched that not only political structures and forces of the member
countries can shape the policies of these international organizations, but also that the
policy of the international organizations can have a substantial impact on the political
and economic situation of the member countries.
2.6 Domestic Institutions and International Policy
Policymaking certainly takes place in an institutional environment and we there is
considerable evidence that this institutional environment shapes the policy outcome.
Recent contributions for example showed that presidential regimes tend to provide
less public infrastructure than parliamentary systems.13 If institutions already shape
national policy, they should shape the structure of international policymaking as well.
Putnam (1988) presents a formal model of international negotiations. He identi￿es
the basic institutional structure of international negotiations as a two stage game.
In a ￿rst step appointees (which can be diplomats or politicians) have to reach an
agreement. This agreement has to get rati￿ed by a national political institution, for
example a parliament. Considering the strategic situation, it is important to realize
that the national institutions at the second stage can only agree or disagree with the
result of the previous negotiations. Being aware of that, the negotiators on the ￿rst
stage will only negotiate agreements where they can be sure to get rati￿ed in the second
12For a recent survey see Little (2001).
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stage. This de￿nes a set with all Pareto-improvements to the status quo, which Putnam
calls the "win-win" set. The exact characteristics of the win-win set will depend on the
negotiators characteristics, the national political processes and the institutional details
of the negotiations. The same is true for the chosen outcome of the negotiation process.
Still Putnam is able to identify factors that shape the set of possible outcomes.
Knowing that the characteristics of appointees, national political processes and in-
stitutional details in￿ uence the outcome of the negotiations, national politicians will
have an incentive to chose or set them to their own advantage. If the appointees type
is of importance, this generically gives rise to a delegation problem as one might want
to carry out negotiations by someone with preferences di⁄erent from one￿ s own (del-
egation to hawks). If characteristics of the national political process are important,
one might change this in order to in￿ uence the set of acceptable outcomes. Political
scientists refer to this concept as a rise in the step-back costs. One can pass laws before
the negotiations process, in order to rule out unfavorable outcomes of the negotiation
process.14. There are many ways how institutional details can become important. In-
deed, there is a rich literature in political science that discusses the role of ultimatums,
threats to incorporate other issues as well and threats never to negotiate among the
same issue again.15 This points out to the design of international organizations again.
Most organizations have rather strict procedural rules how to negotiate. The World
Trade Organization, for example, allows claims only to be ￿led by states. Putnam￿ s
considerations have shaped the understanding international organizations and negoti-
ations.16
2.7 Conclusion and Outlook
In this chapter, we gave some perspectives on the interdependence of national policies
in international markets and the strategic interaction this implies. We could show that
the desirability of policy coordination crucially depends on the objectives of politicians.
We did not come up with simple conclusions and recommendations as national policy-
making in international markets has too deal with two frictions: on the one hand, there
14Baldwin (1985) describes this for the case of U. S. trade policy.
15For a survey see Berridge (1995).
16Very recent contributions include Lorz and Willmann (2005). The authors interpet politics on a
European level as a two stage game and analyze e⁄ects of strategic delegation. Contrary to common
sense, they show that this strategic delegation e⁄ect will lead to an undrprovision of public goods on
the European level. Similar ideas can also be found in Chari et al. (1997).Domestic Debt as a Commitment Device 19
is an inter-country friction as politicians do not take into account the e⁄ect of their
policies on other countries; on the other hand, there can be political frictions as politi-
cians do not necessarily want to maximize social welfare. Both frictions can attenuate
or amplify each other. In order to come up with a clear answer we have to consider
the underlying economic model and the assumed objective function of politicians.
Finally, we recognized that policy cooperation takes place in an institutional setting.
We stressed the presence of international organization in international policymaking
and showed that it is not only domestic institutions that shape the policy outcome,
but also the structure and presence of international institutions. In what follows, we
present two political economy models from two di⁄erent policy area: one model of
sovereign debt and one of regulatory policy. Nevertheless, the interaction of political
and inter-country frictions will be a recurrent topic in the following two chapters of
this dissertation.Chapter 3
Domestic Debt as a Commitment
Device - A Probabilistic Voting
Model of Sovereign Debt
3.1 Introduction
Sovereign debt di⁄ers from private debt in many respects. First of all, collateral is
rather seldom given. Second, there are no direct means that can force a sovereign to
repay. Third, there are no speci￿ed procedures what to do with a sovereign debtor
that is unwilling or unable to repay. Not surprisingly, sovereign debt is very often
characterized by a history of partial default, delays in repayment and rescheduling.
These observations lead many researchers to the conclusion that the decision to repay of
a Sovereign Debtor is ultimately a political one, since repayment depends on willingness
rather than ability (as it is the case for a private debtor).1
Although, there seems to be a broad consensus, that the repayment decision is a
political one, few approaches have been undertaken to model this political decision
explicitly.2 A large amount of the literature assumes ￿explicitly or implicitly ￿that
the borrowing economy is ruled by a benevolent dictator that compares the gains
and losses from repayment and default and takes the action that will generate the
1See for example Rogo⁄ (2001).
2For an alternative view see Hellwig (1989). Hellwig does not deny the importance of the will-
ingness to repay, but points out that it might be di⁄erent to distinguish actually between lack of
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higher bene￿ts for the domestic economy. This might be a valid working assumption
and can be justi￿ed if the conditions of the Coase theorem are met. However it is
doubtful that redistribution without transaction costs is technically and politically
feasible. Furthermore, the political economy literature points out that it is not clear at
all why a politician has an objective to maximize social bene￿t, rather a politician tries
to get re-elected, maximize his private bene￿t from holding o¢ ce or simply implement
his own preferred policy. Summing up all these arguments, it seems indeed necessary
to formulate a political process explicitly. In what follows, we will consider a politician
that does not want to maximize social welfare but simply wants to get re-elected.
A large strand of literature takes it for granted that even if there are no direct
mechanisms that can enforce repayment of a sovereign state, there are at least some
indirect mechanisms foreign creditors can evoke in order to enforce repayment. Two
very often quoted possibilities are the threat of a trade embargo or the exclusion from
future ￿nancial markets. It is however not too di¢ cult to see that both mechanisms
have their own weaknesses.3 In what follows, we will consider an extreme case, namely
we will look at a world in which foreigners have no punishment possibilities at all
against a defaulting sovereign state. Although the existing literature suggests that in
this world a sovereign debtor will not be able to issue any bonds at all to foreigners,
we will be able to show that even in this case foreigners will be willing to give money
to a sovereign state under appropriate assumptions. If foreigners cannot punish a
defaulting government, but domestic residents can, then it might still be the case that
this threat alone is so strong that it will force a sovereign government to repay, provided
the government cannot distinguish between a foreign and a domestic bondholder. This
points to a neglected mechanism that sustains sovereign debt: the punishment power of
domestic residents. This implies however that domestic residents have to gain a certain
strength, otherwise it is not possible for their governments to sell bonds to international
capital markets. The model will also derive conditions for this to be feasible at all.
The literature dealing with the political decision of repayment is very small so
far. Drazen (1998) considers a median voter model where the median voter decides
on how much of the debts will be repaid. In his model, a government can not only
distinguish, whether a particular bond is held by a domestic or a foreign resident,
it can also commit to repay domestic residents while it cannot commit to foreign
residents. This assumption seems to be at least doubtful. Nevertheless Drazen is able
to identify the factors that will favour repayment or partial default in this setting.
3It is not clear why trade sanctions are a credible (in the sense of subgame-perfect) threat. Bulow
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Harms (2002) shows in an overlapping generations Model that heterogeneous interests
might play an important role for the decision of the sovereign whether to repay its
debt or not.4 In particular, Harms assumes that a government maximizes its support
function. Whereas the young generation will always be in favour of repayment, since
all punishments will hurt it, the old generation will always want an outright default.
Depending on expectations, two subgame-perfect equilibria are possible, one with full
international diversi￿cation and one with pure autarky. The model is remarkable as
it suggests that not only heterogeneous interests might play an important role in this
context, but also the way these interests are aggregated into a political decision.
In what follows, we will model explicitly the strategic situation between a reelec-
tion seeking government, domestic non-bondholders, domestic bondholders and foreign
bondholders in a world with uncertainty.
3.2 The Model
We will consider the following strategic situation. First an incumbent government
decides in period 0 on how much debt to issue in order to provide public goods. In
period 1, this debt is sold to the market. Then the government decides on whether to
repay the debt or not in period 2. In order to repay the debt, however, the government
has to impose a lump-sum tax on all voters. Thereafter voters decide whether they
want to re-elect the government or replace it by an opposition.
The domestic economy is populated by a population of mass one. Therefore the
per capita debt d will equal the total amount of debt, a property that will keep the
notation simple. Each resident derives utility from private income y and a publicly
provided good g.
U (y;g) = y + v (g) (3.1)
v (g) satis￿es the Inada conditions. This implies that all residents want at least one
marginal unit of public good as long as the cost of providing it will not be in￿nitely
high. The public good however has to be ￿nanced by debts, since there is no taxing in
period 1. The paper abstracts from this possibility as it does not focus on the optimal
4Harms considers the political risk foreign direct investment faces. However, it is not di¢ cult to
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tax splitting of a re-election seeking government, but on its incentives to honour issued
debt. We will specify the market structure and the political process in the following
paragraphs.
3.2.1 Market Structure
A fraction p of the debt is bought by domestic residents, where p is a random variable
that can take on values between 0 and 1. p is distributed with a distribution function
f(p), which is common knowledge. This captures the fact that everybody has some
beliefs about the fraction of the debt that will be held by domestic residents, whereas
it is not possible to know the exact value at the time this debt is sold to the market. In
Period 2 however the government (and the investors) will know the exact realization of
p. It seems reasonable to assume that the government can get some information about
the fraction of domestically held bonds by for example studying the current account.
The point of the paper is not to claim that the government will get perfect information
about the p, but that it is at least able to collect some information about the actual
realization of p.
Note however that the government can learn only the aggregate value of p, it is not
able to distinguish for an individual bond who holds it. This captures the fact that
the sovereign debt is sold on an anonymous bond market. While it might not matter
a lot from a pure macroeconomic perspective whether the debt is in the form of a
credit or in the form of bonds, it matters a lot from a political economy point of view.
Whereas it is more or less obvious who is the creditor of a credit, it is quite di⁄erent for
a debtor to know who holds her bonds. This is particularly true if the bonds are not
issued on capital markets only, but also traded. In the context of sovereign debt, it is
important to distinguish between a domestic creditor and a foreign creditor, since both
have di⁄erent possibilities to punish a government that is unwilling or unable to repay.
In contrast to the literature, that often assumes that foreign residents can exclude a
defaulting government from future capital markets or induce trade sanctions against
the defaulting country, we will consider a world where foreigners have no possibility at
all to credibly threat to punish a defaulting government. This might be a reasonable
approximation of reality, if the country dealt with is big or important for strategic
or other non-economic considerations. But even, if one deals with small countries
the question is important, since conventional wisdom would assume that such a small
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So, even if foreigners have no punishment possibilities at all, domestic residents
might have some opportunities to sanction a defaulting government, thereby enforcing
repayment. If the government in charge is a democratic government, domestic residents
could simply vote for a new government if they dislike the default decision of their
government. Another way to enforce repayment could be to in￿ uence the political
decision with various kinds of lobbying activities. We will consider a political process
that allows for both interpretations. However, we will also assume that the government
ex-ante is not able to estimate the relative strength of di⁄erent interest groups with
certainty.
Next, we will assume that the sovereign debt will be issued in the form of zero
bonds, i. e. each unit of debt will earn 1 in the case of repayment, 0 in the case
of default. Again, this assumption is made for analytical convenience. If there are
su¢ ciently liquid and integrated capital markets, the government will be able to sell
all of the issued bonds. However, the price q might be very low if investors anticipate
that the repayment probability will be very low. In the extreme case, if the market
does believe that the government will never repay, this price q can drop to 0.
Investors will be able to price this bond only if there is another ￿nancial instrument
that allows shifting income from period 1 to period 2. The model assumes that there
is a risk less alternative investment that costs 1 in period 1 and will be repaid with 1
in period 2. All investors are risk-neutral, rational and operate under the same infor-
mation set. Risk-neutrality of the investors might look like a very strong assumption,
since it is well known that one of the most important functions of ￿nancial markets is
to allocate risks. In this setting, however, risk-neutrality is not crucial for the results,
but simpli￿es our calculations considerably. The assumptions of rationality and the
same information set of all agents imply arbitrage-free capital markets in this simple
setting. Furthermore, it will turn out that all investors will be willing to pay the same
price q for the government bonds, which therefore will be determined endogenously in
period 1.
3.2.2 Political Structure - Probabilistic Voting
The domestic economy will be ruled by a government that has neither any policy
preferences on its own nor any motivation to maximize social welfare, instead it simply
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party will be challenged by an opposition that tries to get into power as well. This
opposition has no own interests as well. Like the ruling government, it simply wants
to gain power. Both parties will o⁄er a policy platform that consists of an amount of
debt that is issued in period 0 and the decision whether to repay the issued debt or
not in period 2.
The voting behavior of an individual voter is uncertain from the point of view of
the politicians. It is not possible to predict that a particular voter will vote for the
party that o⁄ers her the platform that gives her a higher utility. The reason for that
might be that a voter has a political bias for one or the other party. A voter who is
biased towards party A will only vote for party B, if the policy platform party B o⁄ers
gives her a utility that is high enough to compensate her for her ideological bias ￿:
U (A) + ￿ < U (B) (3.2)
Another reason why a voter does not vote for the party that gives her the higher
utility might simply be the fact that she makes mistakes, since she lacks the ability to
calculate the exact utility a party platform o⁄ers her. If this bias term or mistake term
is not known to the parties for an individual voter, but only in the aggregate of the
population, the voting behavior in this economy can be described by a probabilistic
voting model. Although there are di⁄erent behavioral assumptions that can lead to this
stochastic element in the voting decision, it is crucial that there exists no deterministic
mapping from a policy platform to the voting decision of an individual voter. Put
di⁄erently, a policy platform induces only probability for a certain voting decision.
Next, we assume that the mistake or bias term will not be the same for all voters.
Since there are two groups of people in the economy, I will assume for simplicity that
all bondholders have the same error or bias term. This does not mean literally that
every individual in one group has the same error or bias term; it simply captures the
fact that the groups as a whole might have di⁄erent error or bias terms.
In particular, I will assume that a member of the group of bondholders will have
an error term ￿ that is drawn from the following uniform distribution:
With




The error term non bondholders have, is drawn from the following uniform distri-Domestic Debt as a Commitment Device 26
bution,
with




This is for simplicity normalized to be of length 1.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the distribution of the error or bias term of bond-
holders is not known with certainty. This means ￿ is a random variable that is drawn
from a distribution g(￿). As already mentioned, being well informed translates straight-
forward into having political power in a probabilistic voting model. Therefore, we can
take the random ￿ as a measure of political in￿ uence. It is important however to keep
in mind that the relative strength of bondholders is not known with certainty, since ￿
is drawn from the distribution g(￿), where all realizations of ￿ have to be positive.
If we assume retrospective voting behavior (i. e. voters make their voting decision
conditional on the level of utility they currently enjoy) and both parties have no policy
preferences on their own except of gaining power, they face the same maximization
problem. This implies that they will o⁄er the same platform in equilibrium. What
matters is that the engagement in a political competition forces both parties to maxi-
mize the same objective function. In particular, if the individual bias terms are drawn
from a uniform distribution with the borders ￿b and b, parties will maximize the fol-
lowing function by choosing an amount of debt d and then eventually deciding whether








(y + v (g))f (b)h(y)dbdy (3.5)
This support function is simply a weighted sum of all utilities of domestic residents.
The weights correspond to the error or bias terms of di⁄erent groups. The smaller the
support of the distribution of the individual error or bias term b, the more weight
the government puts on the utility of this particular voter. In other words, being
well informed, or being biased in an easily predictable way translates into political
power. This is a very common property of probabilistic voting models and has a very
intuitive interpretation: The more informed a voter is, the more easily she will recognize
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redistributive measures of government. On the other hand a voter who is only badly
informed has to be given relatively more transfers so that she realizes that it is indeed
one particular party that gives her a higher utility, which makes her a less attractive
target for redistributive measures.5
This objective function of the government however can not only be motivated by
a probabilistic voting model. An alternative, although less micro founded, way of
justifying this function, is simply to take it ad hoc as a support function. A support
function captures the idea that a government somehow tries to maximize the utility of
the domestic population in order to increase its own popularity. However if some groups
have more possibilities to in￿ uence the government than others, the government will
put more weight on their utility than on the utilities of other groups. The disadvantage
of this speci￿cation is that it is not very speci￿c about the channels di⁄erent lobbying
groups make their interests heard.
In this model, government can in￿ uence the utility of an individual voter in four
di⁄erent ways. It can provide public goods, sell bonds, tax, and repay bonds. Whereas
all individuals will be in￿ uenced by taxing and providing public goods symmetrically,
selling and repaying bonds will only in￿ uence the utility of bondholders.6 Keeping in
mind that bondholders have a political power of ￿, that is not known with certainty
ex-ante, and that they are a fraction pd of the total population, we can rewrite the






￿pdU (y;g)g (￿)d￿ + (1 ￿ pd)U (y;g)f (p)dp (3.6)
The ￿rst termdenotes the bondholders￿utility, the second termthe non-bondholders￿
utility. Note that the support of the bondholder group is ex-ante stochastic for two
reasons. On the one hand, it is not clear how big the bondholder group will be; on the
other hand it is also not clear how well informed they will be.
Next, consider that bondholders will have to pay the price q in period 1 for the
bonds and they will earn 1 in the case of repayment and 0 in the case of default. As
will become clearer later on, the price q of one unit of debt will depend on the total
amount of debt issued. The utility of non-bondholders will not be in￿ uenced by the
issuance and repayment of bonds. If x denotes a dummy variable that is 1 in the case
5Another application of a probabilistic voting model is Dixit and Londregan (1998).
6This is due to the fact that we assumed all taxing to be done in a lump sum fashion.Domestic Debt as a Commitment Device 28







[￿pd(￿q (d) ￿ dx + x) + v (q (d)d)g (￿)d￿ +
+(1 ￿ pd)(￿dx + v (q (d)d))]f (p)dp (3.7)
This is the complete maximization problem of the government in period 0. It
maximizes this function by a choice of d in period 0 and a choice of x in period 2.8
Note that in order to solve the maximization problem, the government has to take into
account that its choice of d will in￿ uence the price the market is willing to pay for
the bonds. This price however will be in￿ uenced in turn by the expected repayment
probability. The next paragraph will be more formal on that issue.
Again for analytical convenience, it is necessary to assume that the government
cannot simply take away income from one group and give it to another group. Since
utility is linear in income, this would lead to a solution in which the government would
take away all income from the less well informed group of domestic inhabitants and
give it to the other group. Also such an equilibrium would still imply the issuance
of a certain amount of sovereign debt, it seems to be quite realistic to assume this
away, since taking away all income might be technically infeasible or prohibited by
constitutional rules.
7The assumption that x has to be either 0 or one is not restrictive. Since the payo⁄ function is
linear in the repayment rate y, it is never optimal to choose a y between 0 and 1.
8This naturally raises the question of the timing of the elections. The model assumes that elections
take place at the last stage of the game; this implies a retrospective voting behaviour. One could also
assume that elections are held even before period 0; in this case one would have to assume that the
government can make binding commitments to choose the announced policy variables. It is even
possible to have elections at every stage of the game, since elections do not in￿ uence the game per se
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3.3 Positive Analysis
Obviously this strategic situation involves uncertainty about the fraction of debt that
is bought by domestic bondholders and about the information bondholders and non-
bondholders have. Therefore the appropriate solution concept of this game will be a
Bayesian equilibrium. A strategy of the government consists of an amount of debt d
chosen in period 0 and the decision x to repay or not in period 2. It is important to
keep in mind that the government knows the values of p and ￿, when it has to decide
over x. By choosing an amount of debt d, the government has to take into account its
believes about the distribution of the random p and the random ￿, but also about how
the chosen amount of debt will in￿ uence the price investors are willing to pay for the
issued debt and how it will in￿ uence the optimal strategy to repay or not.
A strategy of an investor consists of a price q she is willing to pay for the issued
debt. Since all investors operate under the same information set and the government is
not able to treat them di⁄erently, all investors will choose the same optimal strategy in
equilibrium. This in particular implies that domestic residents will not be able to pay
a di⁄erent price than foreign investors. This is true although domestic residents can
punish the defaulting government and foreigners can not. As the government cannot
distinguish between domestic and foreign residents, it does not matter whether an
individual investor is a domestic or a foreign resident. What matters is the aggregate
composition of domestic and foreign bondholders, which is captured by the realization
of the random p.
Therefore, the Bayesian equilibrium will consist of the following set of strategies.
d = d(g (￿);f (p)) chosen in period 0 by the government
q = q (g (￿);f (p)) chosen in period 1 by each investor
x = x(￿;p;d) chosen in period 2 by the government
Note that x has to be chosen at a stage where all uncertainty has been resolved,
therefore it is a function of the realized ￿ and p, not of their distribution functions.
In order to determine the optimal strategies of all players, one has to solve the game
by backward induction, which means one ￿rst has to determine the optimal strategy
of the government in period 2. As already mentioned, at this stage of the game the
government knows the realizations of ￿ and p: Therefore it will repay, if and only if
it gets a higher support from repaying than from defaulting. Defaulting will generate
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and no repayment either. Repaying, on the other hand, will generate an additional
support of ￿pd(1 ￿ d) ￿ (1 ￿ pd)d in the aggregate, since d is the whole amount of
debt that has been issued (which also equals per capita debt) and pd is the fraction
that is held by domestic residents. Note that in the case of repayment bondholders
and non-bondholders have to be taxed by a lump-sum tax d. This implies that non-
bondholders always want their government to default, since repaying only means a tax
burden to them. On the other hand, as long as d is smaller than 1, which has to be
the case in equilibrium, domestic bondholders always favour repayment, which leaves
them with a net gain of 1 ￿ d. To be precise, the government will opt for repayment,
if the following inequality holds.
￿pd(1 ￿ d) ￿ (1 ￿ pd)d ￿ 0 (3.8)
The ￿rst term denotes the support a repaying government gets from bondholders
for repaying, the second term captures the resistance of non-bondholders to repayment.
The higher the realized ￿, the more likely repayment becomes. A high ￿ captures the
fact that bondholders are relatively well-informed about the political process (Prob-
abilistic Voting) or that they managed to organize relatively well (Lobbying model).
In particular, if ￿ is smaller than or equal to one (which means bondholders are nei-
ther better informed than non-bondholders nor could they organize better), repayment
will never occur in equilibrium. Put di⁄erently, for sovereign debt to be sustainable
in the above speci￿ed setting, it is a necessary condition that domestic bondholders
are (for whatever reasons) politically more in￿ uential than non-bondholders. In par-
ticular, by reformulating the above stated inequality, one can construct the following








Or, stated in a more formal way:
￿ : (p;d) ! ￿
￿(p;d) =
￿
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The repayment correspondence gives us all values of ￿ for a given d and p, for which
the government will decide to repay, since repayment generates a higher support than
non-repayment. It is important to keep in mind that the repayment correspondence
contains no stochastic elements, since at this stage of the game all uncertainty is
resolved.
The repayment correspondence has the following properties.
￿(p1;d) ￿ ￿(p2;d) if p1 < p2
￿(p;d1) ￿ ￿(p;d2) if d1 > d2 (3.11)
The ￿rst property has a very intuitive interpretation. It simply says that the fraction
of domestic bondholders and their political power are substitutes. The more voters of
the domestic economy hold bonds, the less powerful they have to be in order to get
repayment. Put di⁄erently, two things tend to favour repayment: either a large fraction
of domestic voters has to hold bonds or they have to be powerful. Already at this stage,
we have identi￿ed the two factors that will be crucial for repayment.
The second property of the repayment correspondence implies that in order to repay
a higher debt d, there has to be a larger fraction of bondholders or they have to be
more politically in￿ uential.
One can show that for each combination of p and d, there is exactly one value of ￿
that will ful￿l the above stated weak inequality with equality. In what follows, I will
refer to that value of ￿ as the critical ￿ or ￿crit. In other words, ￿crit is a function of
the following form:




Given p and d, for all ￿ > ￿crit, the government will repay, for all values below
it will default.9 Since ￿crit de￿nes the borders of the repayment correspondence, it
follows straightforward from the properties of the repayment correspondence that ￿crit
is a function with the following properties.
9For the critical alpha, the government is indi⁄erent between both. Since this event will occur
with probability 0, it is not necessary to specify a strategy than conditions on the occurrence of that












2 > 0 (3.14)
Rationality of investors implies that they will anticipate that the government in
period 2 will only repay, if repaying generates a higher support than defaulting. That
is to say, they know that the optimal policy rule of the government is fully described by
the repayment correspondence. Since the government will repay each bond either with
one or with zero, the price a rational, risk-neutral investor is willing to pay will simply
be the repayment probability. This repayment probability is already implicitly de￿ned
by the repayment correspondence, insofar as the repayment correspondence is nothing
but a description of governments￿optimal policy rule. If ￿ is above ￿crit, government
will repay, otherwise default. Some reformulations lead to the following expression for
q, which not only denotes the price paid, but also the repayment probability.
q = 1 ￿ G(￿crit (p;d)) =










This means that the optimal strategy for a risk-neutral and rational investor is
simply to pay a price equal to the calculated default probability.10 Note that this
optimal strategy has to take into account the stochastic nature of ￿ and p, since at
this stage of the game, the realizations of ￿ and p are not known.
Nevertheless, this equation can also be interpreted as a function q(d), that shows
that each amount of debt issued will lead to exactly one price q that will be paid by the
market for one unit of government debt.11 This implies that one can rule out multiple
equilibria, as the governments decision in period 2 for given ￿ and p can be predicted
perfectly. This means every d induces exactly one repayment probability. Furthermore,
10To be precise, q denotes the maximum price a rational and risk-neutral investor is willing to pay.
If we assume however that there is su¢ ciently much competition between foreign investors, they will
drive the price up to q.
11Obviously q is not only a correspondence, but also a function of d. Since ￿ is a function of d,
F(￿) is also a function of d. Therefore q is a function of d:Domestic Debt as a Commitment Device 33








f (p)dp < 0 (3.16)
Again this has a very natural interpretation. The more debt a government issues,
the less it will get for one unit of debt. This is due to the fact that more debt will lead to
a higher burden of repayment. A higher burden of repayment in turn will lead to more
domestic resistance of repayment, since the support of bondholders, 1￿d, for repayment
decreases, but still stays positive, whereas the resistance d of non-bondholders increases.
In order to understand this result, it is important to keep in mind that as long as one
unit of debt is held by a foreigner, repayment is in essence redistribution from domestic
residents to foreign residents. Of course, rational investors anticipate this di¢ culty,
and adjust their repayment expectations appropriately. In very vague sense, one can
compare the government￿ s problem to the problem a monopolist faces: Producing more
lowers the price, although for very di⁄erent reasons.12
Having derived the price q of government bonds as a function of d, one can now
rewrite the government￿ s maximization problem in period 0 as maximizing its support
function over d.
The optimal strategy of government and opposition is to choose an amount of per


















[￿pd(1 ￿ d) ￿ (1 ￿ pd)]g (￿)f (p)d￿dp (3.17)
The ￿rst term shows the disutility domestic bondholders experience when buying
12The maximization problem of the government is much more complex, since issuing more debt
also enables to provide more public goods, but also generates the opposite e⁄ect in creating further
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the debt. The second term gives us the utility each voter in the economy experiences by
the provision of public goods for which the debt has been issued. Note that this utility
is enjoyed by everybody in the domestic economy, independent of whether she bought
bonds or not. The last term is again the repayment correspondence that captures the
fact that the government will only repay if repayment generates a higher support than
default which generates a support of 0. Therefore the integral is only taken over values
for which the term under the integral is bigger or equal than zero.
Unfortunately, one cannot solve this maximization problem analytically. The fol-
lowing two lemmas however establish the existence of an interior solution.
Lemma 1 A government can issue debt at international capital markets, if






This implies that there is correspondence that maps E(1=p) into ￿max. For all
￿max inside the correspondence, it is feasible to sell debt to the market; therefore I
will refer to that correspondence as the feasibility correspondence ￿. The feasibility







Again, the borders can be described by a function ￿max
crit . As will become clearer later
on, the feasibility correspondences determines whether one will arrive at a Bayesian
equilibrium with bond-emission or at a Bayesian equilibrium without bond emission.
(Proof can be found in appendix)
Lemma 1 is already in itself noteworthy, since it gives a necessary condition for
sovereign debt to be feasible at all. It says that there has to be at least one realization
of and therefore one state of the world ￿, in which bondholders are su¢ ciently powerful
in order to sustain the smallest amount of debt possible. This implies that there has
to be at least one ￿ that is bigger than one (all values of p are between 0 and1).
We can also see that the fraction of domestic bondholders matters: the more do-
mestic bondholders, the less in￿ uential they have to be. Obviously, this property couldDomestic Debt as a Commitment Device 35
already be seen in the repayment correspondence. This is due to the fact that in
this Bayesian equilibrium the issues of repaying and buying bonds are no independent
events, but depend on the same priors overf (p) and g (￿).
Lemma 2 If government and opposition maximize their probability of win-
ning the elections, they will choose a strictly positive amount of debt d,
provided the necessary conditions for bond-emission as speci￿ed in lemma
1 are ful￿lled.
The proof of the lemma is rather involved and therefore delegated to the appendix.
Nevertheless it tells us that a government will issue bonds, if it can. Or put di⁄erently
lemma 2 gives us the last missing variable of the Bayesian equilibrium. Summing up
everything leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If ￿ and E (p) are in the set described by the feasibility corre-
spondence ￿, there is a unique Bayesian equilibrium that consists of a d > 0
(chosen in period 0), a price q ( 0 < q < 1, chosen in period1)and a decision
x (chosen in period 2) whether to repay or not. Depending on the actual
realizations of the random ￿ and p, x can be either 0 or 1.
If ￿ and E (p) are not element of the set that is de￿ned by the feasibility
correspondence ￿, then there is a continuum of Bayesian Equilibria with
the following properties, d ￿ 0, q = 0 and x = 0. In this case the government
will never repay and therefore is not able to sell any debt to the market.
This proposition follows straightforward from lemma 1 and lemma 2. Once an opti-
mal amount of debt is chosen by the government, this will induce one price q, rational
investors are willing to pay. After that ￿ and p are realized and the government follows
its optimal decision rule in choosing x as speci￿ed by the repayment correspondence.
This result is remarkable for some reasons. First of all, it shows that even if for-
eigners have no possibilities to punish a defaulting government, they might under the
above speci￿ed circumstances (lemma 1) be willing to lend money to this government.
They are willing to do that, since they know that the governments aim is to please its
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however, if there are enough voters that hold bonds and therefore have a vital interest
in repayment or if they are su¢ ciently powerful in the political process. It is however
important to keep in mind that this result depends on the assumption that the govern-
ment is not able to treat foreigners and domestic residents di⁄erently. Therefore this
paper has identi￿ed a new mechanism that might sustain sovereign debt even in the
absence of all punishment possibilities of foreigners: it is simply the fact that domestic
residents might have an interest in getting repaid.
In order to understand the result, it is important to realize that repayment has re-
distributive e⁄ects within domestic economy and between the domestic and the foreign
economy. If debt is repaid, each debt holder gains 1￿d, whereas each non-bondholder
has to pay d for that. The fact that some voters in the domestic economy gain from
repayment is essentially the mechanism that is needed in order to guarantee the re-
payment of the sovereign debt. Nevertheless repayment has also redistributive e⁄ects
between the domestic economy and the foreign economy. Each foreign bondholder
gains 1, if the debt is repaid. Since the whole indebtedness to foreigners amounts to
(1 ￿ pd)d, repayment is a transfer of (1 ￿ pd)d from the domestic economy as a whole
to foreigners.
3.4 Normative Implications
Now, once a positive result has been established, it is interesting to look at its nor-
mative properties. Having looked at an opportunistic policy-maker who simply tries
to maximize his re-election probability, it seems natural to compare this setting to a
benevolent dictator who tries to maximize a Benthamite Welfare function.13 Since a
Benthamite Social Welfare Function simply adds up all individual utilities, each indi-





In what follows, it is important to keep in mind that a sovereign government can-
not commit to do anything by the mere fact that it is sovereign. Therefore, it is
13Although the term benevolent dictator allows for di⁄erent interpretations, in what follows I will
use it in exactly that way. The benevolent dictator tries to maximise social welfare under the same
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straightforward to derive the following lemma.
Lemma 3 If the domestic government is a benevolent dictator, the induced
game has a continuum of Bayesian Nash Equilibria with d = d; x = 0; q = 0.
All of these equilibria imply that the issued bonds will not be bought and
repaid, in other words, the sovereign is not able to raise money at capital
markets. In other words regardless of ￿ and E (p), the game will always yield
the no emission equilibrium as speci￿ed by proposition, as the feasibility
correspondence is always empty.
Proof: The benevolent dictator will repay, if the following is true:
pd(1 ￿ d) ￿ (1 ￿ pd)d = d(p ￿ 1) > 0 (3.20)
This is obviously never true.QED.
Since repayment is not only redistribution within the domestic economy, but also a
redistribution of income from domestic residents to foreign residents, a social planner
who tries to maximize a social welfare function will never do that. Note that the burden
of repayment is completely left to the domestic residents while at least some of gains
from repayment will go abroad. This is due to the fact that repayment is a zero-sum
game. Since rational investors anticipate that a benevolent dictator will never repay,
they will never be willing to give any money to him. If all bonds were held by domestic
residents, the social planner would be indi⁄erent between repaying or not repaying,
since utility is linear in private income.
It is straightforward to see that ex-ante a bondholder and a non-bondholder will
enjoy the same utility. The (ex-ante) utility of a bondholder can be written as:
Ub = y ￿ q + v (qd) + q ￿ 1 + (1 ￿ q) ￿ 0 ￿ qd = y + v (qd) ￿ dq = Unb (3.21)
This result does not come as a surprise, since the bond price q is the outcome of
a Bayesian equilibrium, in which investors had rational expectations about the gov-
ernment￿ s decision. This also justi￿es the assumption that nature chooses whether a
domestic resident becomes a bondholder or not, since one doe at least not make anyDomestic Debt as a Commitment Device 38
systematic mistake by doing the one or the other thing. Note that in an economy









(y ￿ v (qd) ￿ d)h(y)dy (3.23)
In the bond-issuing economy.
Proposition 2 follows straightforward.
Proposition 2 Ex ante, a country ruled by an opportunistic politician (Prob-
abilistic Voting) enjoys a higher welfare (measured by a Benthamite Social
welfare function) than a country that is ruled by a benevolent dictator that
tries to maximize this social welfare function.
Proof: The bond-issuing economy, will do better if:
v (qd) ￿ d > 0 (3.24)
If the bonds are issued by a support maximizing government, it will never choose
a d that reverses the above inequality, since in this case it could do strictly better by
choosing d = 0.




qd > 0 (3.25)
where h could be any ￿nite constant.
This also implies that there are some values for which.Domestic Debt as a Commitment Device 39
v (qd) ￿ d > 0 (3.26)
QED.
This result might come as a surprise since one should expect that a benevolent
dictator that has the objective of maximizing social welfare will generate a higher
social welfare than an opportunistic politician that tries to maximize his re-election
probability. The result depends essentially on the commitment issue. Although, the
opportunistic politician cannot commit to repay either, rational investors understand
that there might be states of the world where the politician will ￿nd it in his own in-
terest to repay. The previous section identi￿ed these states of the world. If there are a
lot of domestic bondholders and their in￿ uence or quality of information is better than
that of the non-bondholders, the politician will maximize his re-election probability by
repaying. Having understood this mechanism, the proposition follows quite straight-
forward. Since at least the ￿rst marginal unit of the public good provides an in￿nite
marginal utility, all domestic residents will desire at least some public good. As the
public good can only be ￿nanced by issuing bonds, only the opportunistic politician
will be able to provide this public good.
Of course, the welfare result stems from the fact that no taxing in period one is
possible. The result that an opportunistic politician can issue bonds, whereas the
benevolent dictator can not, is not due to that assumption. Or put di⁄erently, the
result that an opportunistic politician has a richer choice set seems to be quite robust
in a world where no commitment is possible.
The welfare analysis has only looked at the domestic economy; everything might
be challenged if one considered also the welfare of foreign investors. From a positive
point of view, this does not matter at all, as a politician has no incentive to please
foreigners who are not voters. Putting it in a broader context, this points out to the
fact that the incentives of a politician in an open economy might be di⁄erent from a
politician in a closed economy, as the former will not take into account the spillovers he
puts on other countries. This suggests that there might be welfare gains to be achieved
through international coordination. Indeed, one considers if a speci￿ed procedure, the
Sovereign Debt Bankruptcy Court, might lead to a Pareto Improvement for a variety
of reasons.14 Of course framework discussed above is too simple to provide an answer
to these questions.
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3.5 Conclusion
The aim and starting point of this paper was to show that sovereign debt can be
sustainable even if foreigners have no possibilities to punish a defaulting government
at all. It is su¢ cient to have su¢ ciently many domestic bondholders and/ or them to be
su¢ ciently powerful in the political process. Two di⁄erent versions of being politically
powerful were considered. First voters di⁄ered in the quality of information they had
about the political process. Second they di⁄ered in their lobbying power. The derived
model allows for both interpretations. The model also has the feature that investors
are willing to give money to a sovereign who cannot commit to repay and moreover
where default can indeed happen in equilibrium. The reason why both, repayment and
default, can happen in equilibrium was that at the beginning of the game there is some
uncertainty about the fraction of domestic bondholders and their abilities to in￿ uence
the governments￿decisions. Once this uncertainty is resolved the government makes
its decision based on the actual realizations of the random variables.
Another aim of the model was to take heterogeneous interests in the borrowing
country seriously. Since it might not be appropriate to take the borrowing country
as a single entity with uni￿ed interests, it was necessary to model the divergent in-
terests explicitly. Obviously, bondholders favour repayment, while non-bondholders
tend to oppose it. It became clear that the repayment of sovereign debt has not only
distributive consequences between the borrowing country and abroad, but also within
the domestic country between bondholders and non-bondholders. Ultimately, this re-
distributive mechanism within the borrowing country sustained repayment. However,
it was necessary to be more speci￿c about the way individual preferences ere aggre-
gated into a policy decision; a probabilistic voting model was chosen which was ￿ exible
enough to allow for di⁄erent interpretations as well.
Two things are remarkable about the model discussed above. First, it is to my best
knowledge the ￿rst model which explicitly derives the political decision of repayment
or default. Second it showed that modelling this decision was indeed more than an
intellectual exercise. Once the political process was speci￿ed, it became clear, that
there is a new mechanism that might sustain sovereign debt: the political in￿ uence of
domestic voters.
In a broader context, the model ￿ts into the political economy literature in inter-
national economics. The domestic decision maker can put external e⁄ects on foreign
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her domestic citizens. Surprisingly, the model came up with the result that in this
context, an opportunistic politician might do better than a benevolent dictator for the
domestic economy. Although the opportunistic politician does not take into account
the external e⁄ects of her decision on foreign investors either, he can issue debt on
the market. The reason for the result was that as long it is believed that domestic
bondholders are possibly su¢ ciently strong to enforce repayment, he can raise money
on international capital markets.
This again implies two things. First, it might be quite favorable for a government
to issue bonds in a way that does not allow discriminating between domestic and
foreign investors. If bonds were only issued to foreign investors in the above setting,
they would never be bought, since the sovereign lacks any device to commit to repay.
Second in order to raise any money from foreign investors, it is necessary to have a
su¢ ciently big and politically in￿ uential fraction of domestic residents that hold the
government bonds. If the government debt is held in the form of bonds, it might not
be too unrealistic to assume that foreigners have no punishment possibilities; since in
order to implement any action against a defaulting country, they have to overcome their
coordination problem, since a single foreign investor does indeed not have signi￿cant
punishment possibilities.15 This might be di⁄erent for domestic investors as the election
of a new government does not involve the overcoming of a commitment / free-rider
problem. Taken this together the paper suggests a correlation between the fraction of
domestically held debt and the fraction of debt that is held in the form of bonds.
15This could also shed some light on the so-called home bias in International Finance. The home
bias denotes the phenomenon that a too large portfolio share is held in domestic bonds. The paper
suggests that full risk-diversi￿cation might not be an equilibrium since it is indeed necessary to have
a high fraction of domestically held bonds. Otherwise the incentives of a government to expropriate
might be too large for the diversi￿cation equilibrium to be sustainable.Domestic Debt as a Commitment Device 42
3.6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:






if d is in￿nitely small, this becomes:
￿ ￿ 1
p
Government can only raise money if there is at least one state of the world ￿, in
which the bondholders can enforce repayment, i. e. at least
￿max ￿ 1
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Proof of Lemma 2:
In what follows, we will show that there exists always an interior solution to the
parties maximization problem. The idea of the proof is to show that the support for
choosing the extreme values d = 0 or d ￿ 1 is always zero (Step 1). Next we will show
that there is at least one value d, with 0 < d < 1, for which S is strictly positive.
STEP 1:
For d=0 and d=1, S will be zero


















[￿pd(1 ￿ d) ￿ (1 ￿ pd)]dg (￿)f (p)d￿dp =
= 0 + 0 + 0
note that q(d) can be at most 1


















￿pd(1 ￿ d) ￿ (1 ￿ pd)g (￿)f (p)d￿dp =
= 0 + 0 + 0
This has to be the case, since q (1) = 0.
The government will repay, if:
￿pd(1 ￿ d) ￿ (1 ￿ pd)d > 0
This can never be the case, if d ￿ 1. Therefore the price will drop to 0.
STEP 2:
For d close to 0 : q (d)d > 0
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So, if debt is feasible, it has to be true that:




pf (p)dp < ￿max =) F (￿crit) < 1 =) q (d = 0 + ￿) > 0
This implies that dq (d) > 0:
STEP 3:
If ￿ < ￿crit, the government will default thereby generating a total support of:
This will happen with a probability G(￿crit).
If ￿ > ￿crit, the government will repay thereby generating the following support:

















￿pd(1 ￿ d) ￿ (1 ￿ pd)dg (￿)f (p)d￿dp
Note that the ￿rst and the second term will always be grater or equal to 0, whereas
the third term will be negative or equal to 0.





￿pd + (1 ￿ pd)g (￿)f (p)d￿d(p) = c
Combining both equations yields the following expression:Domestic Debt as a Commitment Device 45
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￿pg (￿)f (p)d￿dp = q (d)d[E (￿)E (p) + Cov (￿;p)] =
= q (d)d ￿ h
where h denotes a ￿nite constant, as long as E (￿)and Cov (￿;p) is not in￿nity,
which seems very reasonable to assume.
STEP 4 (Concavity Argument):
v (qd) ￿ h
cqd > 0
for d close enough to zero.
Step 2 showed that qd is greater than 0 for small values of d. It is however also true
that there are at least small values of qd, g(qd) > hqd. This follows straightforward
from the assumed Inada Conditions.
Therefore, if the conditions of lemma 1 are met, there are always values of d with
the property that S(d) > 0. This however implies that there will be always an interior
solution with 0 < d < 1, if assumption 2 is ful￿lled.
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Note that this lemma only establishes that there is at least one interior maximum,
there could be more than one. In this case the political competition forces both parties
to choose the absolute maximum. See Coughlin (1984) for details.Chapter 4
The Political Economy of
Intellectual Property Rights in
Open Economies
4.1 Introduction
Intellectual property rights have always been on the agenda of the economic profession.
On the one hand, a perfectly competitive market cannot provide su¢ cient incentives
to create new knowledge as knowledge can be copied easily without the inventor being
able to cover his research costs. On the other hand, economists were convinced that
the protection of property rights has a substantial and positive impact on economic
growth.1 Di⁄erent countries, however, have chosen di⁄erent regimes of protection of
intellectual property rights. Recently, a debate emerged whether it is necessary to har-
monize the standards of protection of intellectual property rights internationally and
to what extent. Obviously, di⁄erent countries have di⁄erent interests in how much to
protect intellectual property.2 It was not until very recently, that economists asked
about the welfare e⁄ects of di⁄erent regimes of intellectual property rights protection.
Deardor⁄(1992) considers the welfare e⁄ects of a one size ￿ts all property rights regime,
1See Saint-Paul(2003) for a theoretical examination of this issue.
2For a recent survey see Maskus (1998).Intellectual Property Rights 48
whereas Grossman and Lai (2005) look at the allocation that will result in the inter-
action of national governments that try to maximize their respective national welfare
over an in￿nite time horizon.
While Deardor⁄asks for the welfare e⁄ects of a given policy and Grossman and Lai
assume ad hoc that a national politician wants to maximize national welfare, the aim
of this paper is to look at the property rights regime that will emerge in the interaction
of politicians that do not necessarily want to maximize national welfare, but favor some
groups over others. We derive the resulting allocation and show that politicians that
are biased in favor of some interest groups might actually increase welfare globally, but
do so at the expense of other domestic groups. In particular, we are able to show that a
politician who favors producers￿interests over consumers￿interests can increase world
welfare as compared to a politician that wants to maximize national welfare as a whole.
In doing so the biased national policymaker decreases national welfare as measured as
the sum of producers￿and consumers￿welfare.
In a closed economy a non-welfare maximizing politician can never do better than
a social planner by the mere de￿nition of the terms. In contrast to that, this paper
shows that he might be able to increase global welfare in an open economy. This result
bears some similarity to the previous paper where we showed that a reelection seek-
ing politician can solve the time inconsistency problem of sovereign debt and thereby
increase domestic welfare as a whole ex-ante. Here, a biased politician increases only
world welfare as a whole, but does so at the expense of diminishing domestic welfare.
We will discuss the implication of this strategic e⁄ect later on.
4.2 The Issue and Related Literature
Recently, intellectual property rights made it on the agenda of international trade ne-
gotiations as well as of the academic literature on international trade. Although there
have been treaties that dealt with intellectual property rights since the end of 19th
century, it attained a heightened interest in the last years. Intellectual property be-
came an increasingly important part of national production and international trade.3
Developed economies, however, expressed concerns that the protection of intellectual
property rights is insu¢ cient in developing countries. If producers see their products
3A detailed examination can be found in Eaton and Kortum (1996).Intellectual Property Rights 49
copied in developing countries, they will not only see their pro￿ts decrease, but might
also refrain from further research and development activities. At the same time devel-
oping countries mentioned high social costs of enforcing developed economies property
rights standard in their markets. This is particularly true when it comes to medicines.
After ongoing discussions an intermediate agreement was reached with the TRIPS
treaty in 1994. Although it was signed with unanimity, it came under critique right
from its very beginning. Some developing countries and non-governmental organiza-
tions denounced it as an instrument of neo-imperialistic policies that will come at a
high cost (both in monetary and social terms) to poorer countries. Granting patents
for medicines against diseases such as HIV, malaria or cholera - so the argument goes
- will make these medicines una⁄ordable for the large majority of people in developing
countries and cause a widespread and despicable su⁄ering there, whereas the addi-
tional pro￿ts of the pharmaceutical industry will be negligible compared to the rest of
their total revenue.4 Still, lobbyists of the pharmaceutical industry claim that these
arguments are highly exaggerated and deliberately misleading. Due to price discrim-
ination in di⁄erent markets prices will not rise by a large amount, but the protection
is needed to give security to pharmaceutical producers. Further, the demand structure
for medicines is di⁄erent in third world countries compared to developed countries.
The demand for medicines against malaria is too small in developed countries to guar-
antee a su¢ ciently high investment in this market segment. Diwan and Rodrik (1989)
substantiate this claim in a model. The widespread disagreement over the protection of
intellectual property rights suggests that di⁄erent countries and di⁄erent groups within
countries have divergent interests and that their politicians face very di⁄erent incen-
tives when they negotiate over intellectual property rights. This paper analyses what
kind of agreements one can expect from biased politicians with well de￿ned objective
functions.
Although there is a rich literature that deals with the incentive e⁄ects patents have
on the innovative activity in a closed economy, there is only a small literature that looks
at the issue in open economies. Closed economy models of patents consider a social
planner that wants to maximize domestic welfare over an in￿nite horizon. By granting
a certain patent length, he will induce innovative activity. This, of course, comes at the
prize of less consumer surplus, as by granting a patent the social planner suppresses
competition on a potentially competitive market. In general, the politician￿ s trade-o⁄
will have an interior solution that will imply a ￿nite length of patent protection.5
4See Chaudhuri (2004) for a detailed examination of this argument.
5An exception is Gilbert and Shapiro (1990).Intellectual Property Rights 50
Things might be more complicated in an open economy. The ￿rst paper to address
this question is Deardor⁄ (1994). Deardor⁄ considers a world that is partitioned into
a North that can engage in research and development activities and a South that
cannot. Taking as a reference point a situation in which only the developed North has
protection of property rights, he asks about the welfare e⁄ects of extending the North￿ s
property rights regime to the South. Deardor⁄ is able to show that the welfare e⁄ects
are ambiguous as they depend on the relative size of the South. Although he considers
the welfare e⁄ects of di⁄erent patent policies, he does not specify objective functions
of governments. The analysis is only concerned with welfare and policies are rather
described as exogenous shocks to an economic system.
Grossman and Lee (2005) go one step further and specify a dynamic general equi-
librium model with two countries which can be taken again for North and South. Both
countries are ruled by politicians that want to maximize national welfare over an in-
￿nite horizon. They do so by choosing a certain strength of patent protection that
includes the time of protection as well as strength of it. Finally they derive a Nash
equilibrium in patent protection, that has the following properties:
- In general, patent protection is too low in a world economy that consists of het-
erogeneous countries.
- The size of the ine¢ ciency depends on the relative size of both countries.
- Global harmonization is neither a necessary nor a su¢ cient condition for global
e¢ ciency.
Despite the analytical complexity of the model the welfare properties of the coop-
erative and non-cooperative equilibria depend to a large degree on the inter-country
external e⁄ect: a national policymaker does not take into account that an additional
time unit of patent length will increase the probability of innovation not only for his
home country, but will also generate bene￿ts for the other country as well.
4.3 The Model in a Closed Economy
In this paper, we look at a world economy that consists of two separate and sovereign
countries that are ruled by politicians with well de￿ned objective functions. We relax,
however, the assumption that politicians want to maximize national welfare, as we want
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more or less than consumer surplus. If one looks at a closed economy, a politician that
is biased towards one group of society will always induce an allocation that is inferior
to the allocation a social planner would choose. Things might be di⁄erent in an open
economy, however, as we deal with two sources of ine¢ ciency: On the one hand, there
is an inter-country friction, as politicians do not take into account the e⁄ect of their
policies on other countries, but on the other hand, there is an intra-country friction
as well, as politicians try to cater to certain groups. We identify conditions under
which these frictions amplify each other and under which conditions they attenuate
each other. As it will turn out in the end, a biased national politician might increase
global welfare, but does so at the expense of his own consumers.
In this respect, this chapter is closely related to the previous one, where we could
show that an opportunistic domestic politician might indeed do better than a social
planner who tries to maximize national welfare. The reason there was not this double
coincidence of external e⁄ects, but rather the fact that the opportunistic politician by
the mere virtue of being opportunistic could commit better to certain future policies.
To introduce the basic con￿ ict between static and dynamic e¢ ciency, we ￿rst look
at a closed economy in autarky. In order to simplify the analysis and to derive explicit
solutions, we do not discount future welfare, but assume a ￿nite time horizon instead.
Once we are con￿dent that our maximization problem has an interior solution, this is
not a severe restriction as it does not in￿ uence the quality of our derived properties.
We look at a partial market and allow for any demand structure. We assume that
the protection of intellectual property rights gives the inventor an exclusive right to
the innovation for a time t, such that he will be able to earn monopoly pro￿ts m.6
During the time of protection, consumers will only reap a small consumer surplus from
the innovation that we denote by cS. After the protection expires, competition will
drive down pro￿ts to zero and consumers will get a large consumer surplus cL. We do,
however, abstract from substitution e⁄ects between a new market and existing ones -
something that can be taken into account in theories of optimal patent lengths, but
would only blur our main points. Further, we assume that the producers have to bear
a cost of their research activities C (p(t)).
With these assumptions, social welfare is given by:
W = p(t)(t(m + cS) + (T ￿ t)cL) ￿ C (p(t)) (4.1)
6This is indeed how patents work. In this paper however, we use the term intellectual property
rigths as the term patents rather refers to industrial goods.Intellectual Property Rights 52
Depending on the actual length of protection t, welfare will be the probability
p(t) that an innovation occurs (which is of course a function of the time of patent
protection) times the sum of consumer surplus and monopoly pro￿ts given a certain
time of protection.
Aggregate welfare is a function of the chosen protection length t, which we take
as choice variable of the policymaker. This implies that the politician maximizes the
following objective function:
W = p(t)(t(￿m + cS) + (T ￿ t)cL) ￿ ￿C (p(t)) (4.2)
Note that this objective function di⁄ers from the social welfare function only with
respect to the parameter ￿. This parameter allows us to consider di⁄erent types
of politicians. If ￿ equals one, the politician can be taken as a social planner who
maximizes social welfare. If ￿ is bigger than one, the politician is biased in favor of
producers￿interests, that is, he values monopoly pro￿ts more than consumer surplus.
If ￿ lies between zero and one, the politician favors consumers￿interests over producers￿
interests. In the extreme case of ￿ = 0, he does not care about producers at all.7 This
simple parametrization has its microfoundation in models that allow for lobbying.8 As
we are interested in the e⁄ect of a given bias and not in the process of lobbying per se,
we do not provide an explicit derivation of this parameter.
Finally, we have to specify the producer side. We assume that producers￿pro￿t
function is given by:





Producers￿revenue consists of the product of period monopoly pro￿t m, the dura-
tion of the protection t and the probability that an invention actually occurs. In order
to obtain the total pro￿t one has to subtract the costs of research activities which are
quadratic in the innovative activity p. We take a short term approach and assume
that the entrepreneur can choose a probability p directly. This, admittedly simplistic,
speci￿cation still allows us to capture the basic relationship between innovative activity
and the strength of the patent regime. Innovative activity as captured in the parameter
p also causes a convex cost, which we take to be quadratic in order to derive explicit
7Indeed, ￿ = 0 can be taken as a consumer￿ s utility function.
8See for example the seminal paper of Grossman and Helpman (1994).Intellectual Property Rights 53
solutions. Later on we will argue that this particular speci￿cation does not in￿ uence
our results substantially. b denotes a cost parameter that we assume to be su¢ ciently
big to guarantee an interior solution, i. e. p < 1.9
The entrepreneur maximizes his pro￿t function by the choice of p. In equilibrium,
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(4.5)
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= 0 (4.6)
The ￿rst term captures the marginal bene￿t of a marginal increase of the invention
probability, the second the marginal cost which includes the reduced consumer surplus.





(￿2cL + 2cS + ￿m) < 0 (4.7)
Reformulating leads to:




9We do not go into details, whether this pro￿t function applies to one ￿rm or the whole sector. For
our purposes, it is su¢ cient to have a positive relationship between protection time t and innovative
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We will make frequent references to this condition in what follows. The interpre-
tation is straightforward and intuitive. If this condition is ful￿lled, the policymaker
values a large consumer surplus more than the sum of monopoly pro￿ts and the (small)
consumer surplus in the monopoly case. In this case, he faces a trade-o⁄: On the one
hand he would like to keep the patent lengths as short as possible, on the other hand
he has to take into account the incentive a⁄ect that a longer patent duration has on
producers. Otherwise, the policymaker will always want to choose a patent duration
that is as long as possible which means in terms of the model t = T. In other words,
this condition is a necessary condition for an interior solution and later for the existence
of non-trivial strategic interaction.
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= 0 (4.9)
can be rewritten as:
2t
￿





which leads straightforward to proposition 1.
Proposition 1 If condition 1 is ful￿lled (politician values consumer surplus







The comparative statics are straightforward:
@tN
@￿ > 0. The more emphasis the
politician puts on producers￿interests, the longer the patent length he will choose. As




As it is globally true that @2W
@2t < 0 for all ￿, that ful￿ll condition 1, we can conclude
that preferences are single peaked. This implies in particular in this context that for
each politician and consumer there is exactly one t that maximizes his welfare and the
further the actually chosen t is away from his preferred t, the less utility he will enjoy.10
10Obviously, a consumer as an economic agent has an alpha of zero.Intellectual Property Rights 55
4.4 The Model in an Open Economy
As a next step, we will consider a world that consists of two countries which we will
denote North and South respectively. For simplicity, we assume that only the North
can create new products that can be protected by intellectual property rights 11 Fur-
ther, we will make the assumption that markets can be separated and no arbitrage
exists between the two markets. This is a necessary condition for di⁄erent lengths of
protection to be e⁄ective, otherwise monopoly prices in the market that is protected
for a longer time will be driven down to the competitive level. We will distinguish two
cases. First, we will derive the protection lengths in the North and the South, tN and
tS, a social world planner would choose. Having obtained this normative benchmark,
we will compare it to the Nash equilibrium that will result out of the interaction be-
tween politicians in the North and the South. We further assume that the innovative
sector in the North can be described as in chapter 2.
4.4.1 World Social Planner
As a benchmark case we will look at the ￿rst best allocation a social planner would
choose, if he wanted to maximize global welfare. We capture the di⁄erent size of the
southern market by a variable q, with q > 0. The social planner wants to maximize
the sum of northern and southern welfare by choosing a patent length tN and tS
respectively. Taking into account that northern producers maximize the following
pro￿t function:










the social planner￿ s optimization problem can be stated as:
11This might be a reasonably well description of reality. Grossman and Helpman (1991), for








+ tNcS + qtScS + (T ￿ tN)cL + (T ￿ tS)qcL
i
(4.13)
The ￿rst term in brackets captures the net pro￿t (revenue minus costs) of the
monopolist, the second two terms refer to the reduced (small) consumer surplus during
the time the protection is in place in the North and the South. Finally, the large
consumer surpluses consumers will get once the patent has expired enter the objective
function as well. Maximizing this objective function over the two choice variables







T (1 + q)cL
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cL ￿ cS ￿ m
2
￿ (4.14)
where the asterisks denote the optimal values.







This means, that world welfare is maximized by a set of combinations of tN and
tS .Note that we did not take into account distributional considerations between North
and South. The longer tN, the higher the welfare southern consumers enjoy. In what
follows, we will compare this optimal13 benchmark allocation to the Nash equilibria,
that result from national maximization problems in the non-cooperative solution.
4.4.2 Non-Cooperative Solution
In contrast to the previous section, we now want to study the e⁄ect a biased politician
in the North has on the chosen level of intellectual property rights protection. Therefore






+ tNcS + (T ￿ tN)cL
￿
(4.15)
12Actually, both patent lengths are political choice variables. Maximization of the pro￿t function
will lead to two linearly dependent equations. An intuition for this result will be given below.
13Optimal refers to the maximisation problem of world welfare.Intellectual Property Rights 57
This bears some similarity with the politicians objective function in the closed econ-
omy, but di⁄ers in the inclusion of qtS
m
2 , the additional pro￿t the monopoly producer
gets in the South, if his innovation is protected there. Note also, that the probability
of an innovation depends now on the northern and the southern level of intellectual
property rights protection.
As there are no new products developed in the South that will be protected by
intellectual property rights, monopoly pro￿ts accrue only in the North and do not enter
the southern politician￿ s objective function that consequently contains only small and
large consumer surplus:
WS = p(tN;tS)(tSqcS + (T ￿ tS)qcL) (4.16)
Note also, that all consumer surpluses are multiplied by a factor q, as the South di⁄ers
in size by a factor q.Firms in turn maximize:
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(4.19)




(tSqcS + (T ￿ tS)qcL) (4.20)
Since tN and tS can only take on non-negative values, we maximize over a restricted
domain (non-negativity constraint). Therefore the ￿rst order conditions for the politi-
cians￿maximization problems will be given by the following inequalities:
tN (￿2cL + 2cS + ￿m) + tSq (￿cL + cS + ￿m) + TcL ￿ 0
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for the North and:
tN (￿cL + cS) + tS (￿cL + cS)2q + qTcL ￿ 0
tS ￿ 0 (4.22)
for the South.
Keeping in mind that both values have to be greater or equal to zero, we rewrite
the ￿rst order conditions as:
"
2cL ￿ 2cS ￿ ￿m q (cL ￿ cS ￿ ￿m)











These ￿rst order conditions lead to the following kinked reaction functions:14
tN = max[
TcL
(￿2cL + 2cS + ￿m)
￿
q (￿cL + cS + ￿m)















This implies that tN and tS are strategic substitutes. This is due to the fact that
there is a positive externality in the protection of intellectual property rights between
both countries. If one country extends its property rights protection standard, this
will induce more innovation which obviously has a positive e⁄ect on consumers in
other countries. We will discuss this issue further when we compare the politics of
intellectual property rights to trade policy in paragraph 5.
As the reaction functions are kinked and only piecewise linear, we cannot be sure
that there is always an equilibrium and neither that this equilibrium is always unique
or even interior. Before we proceed, we will clarify this issue in proposition 3. The
14The Kuhn-Tucker conditions tell us that tN ￿ 0, if the ￿rst order condition is ful￿lled with
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proofs for proposition 3 are not very insightful in itself and therefore delegated to the
appendix.
Proposition 3 There is always one and only one equilibrium.
Still, there is the question whether the equilibrium will consist of tN and tS from
the interior of their respective domains or whether one or both of the values lie on
the border of the domain. Depending on the exogenous parameters q and ￿, there
are indeed three di⁄erent equilibria possible. One in which both countries guarantee
protection (which we will call the interior equilibrium) and two corner equilibria in
which one country decides not to protect intellectual property at all. In order to












2cL ￿ 2cS ￿ ￿m
(4.27)
Note that qcrit
N (￿) > qcrit
S (￿) for all possible parameter constellations.
Proposition 4 Depending on the exogenous parameters ￿ and q, there can
be three di⁄erent equilibria. If qcrit
S (￿) ￿ q ￿ qcrit
N (￿), there will be an interior
equilibrium. If q ￿ qcrit
N (￿), there will be an equilibrium with tN = 0 and
tS > 0:If q ￿ qcrit
S (￿), there is an equilibrium with tN > 0 and tS = 0
As one can see, it depends crucially on the size of the South and on the northern
politician￿ s bias which type of equilibrium will be achieved. It turns out that the South
is more likely to grant protection, the bigger it is. If it is relatively small (q ￿ qcrit
S ),
it will opt for no protection. Then there is an intermediate range of values of q for
which both countries will protect intellectual property rights. And ￿nally, for a very
big South, only the South will protect intellectual property rights in equilibrium. This
is indeed in line with what economic intuition predicts. If the South is big, a marginal
increase in its intellectual property rights￿protection will have signi￿cant e⁄ects on
the innovative activity. If the South is small, a marginal increase in the protectionIntellectual Property Rights 60
will cause each individual consumer the same loss in consumer surplus, but give only
little incentive e⁄ects to northern producers. Indeed, if the South is su¢ ciently big
as compared to the North, then the North will stop to grant patent protection as it
knows that its e⁄ects are relatively insigni￿cant.15 Put di⁄erently, there is a classical
free rider problem.
Since we have de￿ned the critical cuto⁄levels qcrit as functions of ￿, we can do some














(2cL ￿ 2cS ￿ ￿m)2 > 0 (4.29)
The more biased the northern politician is in favor of producers￿interests, the bigger
the range of q for which one arrives at the equilibrium with no protection in the South
and the smaller the range of q for which one arrives at an equilibrium with protection
only in the South. As the rational southern politician anticipates that a very biased
northern counterpart has intrinsically high incentives to grant high protection, his own
incentives to do so are deceased in equilibrium. Put di⁄erently, the size of the South
and the bias of the politician are forces that pull in opposite directions. A large South
will make it more likely for its politician to grant protection; a high bias of the Northern
politician less likely.
In what follows we will ￿rst concentrate on the interior Nash equilibrium, that is
described by the following system of equations:
"
2cL ￿ 2cS ￿ ￿m q (cL ￿ cS ￿ ￿m)











If condition 1 is ful￿lled, the determinant of the coe¢ cient matrix will be greater
than zero and the system will have a unique solution. Now we are in a position to
15One can ask if this is a realistic possibility. However, even in terms of the model, it is not. The
South has to be "much" bigger than the North in order for this equilibrium to appear.Intellectual Property Rights 61
characterize the equilibrium rigorously We do so in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 If qcrit
S < q < qcrit
N , there is an interior solution and the

















The more weight the northern politician puts on the welfare of producers, the
longer the chosen protection length. The southern politician, however, will anticipate
this bias and accommodate in the equilibrium with a lower protection length. Again,








The bigger the South, the more protection of intellectual property rights it will
grant. The bigger the southern market, the bigger the incentive e⁄ect on northern
producers, if the south decides to grant a marginally longer protection length.
If we plug tS = 0 into the reaction function of the North and tN = 0 in the
reaction function of the South, we can characterize the corner equilibria in the following
proposition.
Proposition 6 If q > qcrit
N ; there is a corner equilibrium with tN = 0 and
tS =
TcL
2(cL￿cS).Intellectual Property Rights 62
Proposition 7 If q < qcrit




0 and tS = 0.
As it is determined by the exogenous parameters at which equilibrium we will arrive,
we cannot make meaningful welfare comparisons between the corner equilibria and the
interior equilibrium.
4.4.3 Comparison between the Global Welfare Maximizing
Allocation and the Interior Nash-Equilibrium
If we compare the optimal allocation that we derived in section A to the Nash equilib-
rium, we have to keep in mind, that we have to weight North and South according to
their respective market sizes. This implies in particular that we have to compare the
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(2cL ￿ 2cS ￿ m)
(4.35)




S . Note also that we have to weight the







TcL [(2 ￿ q)(cL ￿ cS) + ￿qm]
(cL ￿ cS)(3cL ￿ 3cS ￿ ￿m)
+ q
TcL [(2q ￿ 1)(cL ￿ cS) ￿ ￿qm]
q (cL ￿ cS)(3cL ￿ 3cS ￿ ￿m)
=
=
TcL (1 + q)
(3cL ￿ 3cS ￿ ￿m)
(4.36)
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(3cL ￿ 3cS ￿ m) > (2cL ￿ 2cS ￿ ￿m)Intellectual Property Rights 63
cL ￿ cS ￿ m + ￿m > 0: (4.37)
which has to be true for any partial market.
We state the result in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 The interior Nash equilibrium provides always less than op-
timal protection of intellectual property rights.
Knowing that the non-cooperative equilibrium provides insu¢ cient protection of
intellectual property rights we can ask next how the bias of the politician will a⁄ect
the equilibrium values of property rights protection. While it is a very robust result
for closed economy models that the welfare is decreasing in the bias of the politician,
we can show that this is not the case in this open economy model.
Proposition 9 As the Nash equilibrium implies always insu¢ cient protec-
tion of intellectual property rights, a biased politician in the North can
improve world welfare.









(3cL ￿ 3cS ￿ ￿m)
2 > 0 (4.38)
The result might be puzzling at ￿rst glance, but has a very straightforward inter-
pretation. It is indeed true for a closed economy that overall welfare is non-increasing
in the politician￿ s bias towards one group. In this open economy model, however, we
have to deal with two frictions. On the one hand, there is the politician￿ s bias, on the
other hand, there is the positive externality between both countries which leads to in-
su¢ cient patent protection in the Nash equilibrium. If the politician is biased towards
producers, he is intrinsically motivated to compensate this external e⁄ect as giving
more income to producers (distributive goal) and strengthening the patent protection
(e¢ ciency goal) is achieved by the use of the same policy instrument and, moreover,
by the use in the same direction.Intellectual Property Rights 64
4.5 Trade Policy and Policy of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights
Before we ￿nally conclude, we want to make some remarks on the relationship be-
tween policies that deal with customs and policies that deal with intellectual property
rights.16 Whereas customs used to be the dominant subject in negotiations between
sovereign states and international organizations, their impact decreased signi￿cantly.
This is certainly due to the fact that one saw a large scale elimination of trade bar-
riers in the last ￿fty years. Recently, however, intellectual property rights became a
controversial subject of international negotiations, that led even to the creation of the
World Intellectual Property Organization - a suborganization within the United Na-
tions/World Trade Organization system of trade facilitating negotiations. Given the
increasing importance of the subject, it seems worthwhile to consider similarities and
di⁄erences between both policies and especially the incentives of policymakers that are
in charge of carrying out the respective negotiations. Obviously, political interventions
and political constraints play an important role in international economics. It was
indeed the area of trade policy where political economy emerged as a ￿eld, since the
observed structure of customs was indeed very di⁄erent from the free trade equilibria
proposed by economists.
A very striking and obvious di⁄erence between both policies is their di⁄erent time
structure. Trade policy can be described reasonably well in a static framework. What
is relevant for current trade is the current custom structure. One can assume that the
future customs regime has indeed a negligible impact on the current volume of trade.
This is not true for intellectual property rights. The expected future protection of
intellectual property rights will in￿ uence the level and structure of research activity of
entrepreneurs at present times. In short, the policies of intellectual property rights can
only be understood in a dynamic framework. Consequently, the paper proposed a sim-
ple version of it. Once we deal with dynamic policies and dynamic political constraints,
time consistency becomes a problem. By its very nature granting intellectual property
rights involves issues of time inconsistency, as even in a closed economy a policymaker
has incentives to suspend the protection and thereby increase the domestic welfare
as a whole once the innovation is made. Whereas this problem can be solved in the
domestic case by delegation to independent courts, the problem might be more severe
16Fora general discussion on the importance of intellectual property rights and international trade
see Maskus (1995) and Keller (2004).Intellectual Property Rights 65
in an international world of sovereign states. On the one hand a policymaker from a
low innovation country might have even lower incentives to enforce the protection of a
property right when the pro￿ts accrue to stakeholders in foreign countries (in particu-
lar if it involves a net transfer from a poor to a rich country, which is often the case).
On the other hand there is no international court that has the necessary authority to
force sovereign states to enforce previously agreed property rights standards.
Aside from the issues involved with the time consistency the chosen policy and the
problem of monitoring states enforcement activities, governments incentives depend
for both types of policy on the size of the country as well. These di⁄erences are quite
striking and we will argue in terms of the model.
It is a very robust result in trade theory that a su¢ ciently small country as a whole
can never gain by introducing a custom, whereas there is a positive optimal custom for
a country if the country is su¢ ciently big. By introducing a custom, the government
reduces indeed domestic consumer welfare (negative e⁄ect), but it also decreases de-
mand on world markets and thereby the price of the respective good, which improves
the countries terms of trade (positive e⁄ect). If the country has a non-negligible size,
the second e⁄ect dominates the ￿rst one. This might explain among other factors why
we do not observe free trade world wide, but rather a Nash equilibrium with positive
customs.
The incentives are di⁄erent with intellectual property rights. A large country has
always an incentive to grant a certain degree of intellectual property rights protection,
as its market size will have an impact on the research activity of the innovators. On
the other hand, a small country has strong incentives to act as a free rider. By granting
intellectual property rights protection in an open economy, the policymaker of the small
country gives little additional incentives to further innovation, but imposes a signi￿cant
cost on his citizens.
In other words, the Nash equilibrium in customs would converge to the free trade
(and therefore welfare maximizing) equilibrium, if the size of each individual country
becomes in￿nitely small. The Nash equilibrium in property rights protection would
move further away from the welfare maximizing allocation as the number of countries
becomes in￿nitely small. These considerations are true for politicians that want to
maximize national welfare.
If we compare what happens in the case of non-welfare maximizing politicians, the
results are strikingly di⁄erent as well. Let￿ s ￿rst have a look at the case of trade
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structure that is higher than the country￿ s optimal custom. Increasing the custom
will bene￿t domestic producers and hurt domestic consumers, whereas the loss for the
consumers will be bigger than the gain for the producers. The e⁄ect on the rest of
the world is ambiguous. Things are quite di⁄erent if we consider a policymaker that
is in favor of the producers who need protection of their property rights. Again he
will cause welfare losses to domestic consumers and gains for domestic producers, but
he will exert an unambiguously positive external e⁄ect on foreigners, whether they are
producers or consumers. Foreign producers will bene￿t from the increased protection,
foreign consumers from the higher likelihood of new innovations.
Nevertheless one should also bear in mind that not only market size matters. Cer-
tainly there are countries with small markets, but large industries that need intellectual
property rights protection. In a truly dynamic setting one should also consider that
the amount of research undertaken in a country depends on the protection of property
rights. The implementation of intellectual property rights standards then might work
as a signal for regime change in itself.17
4.6 Conclusion
We explored the degree of intellectual property rights protection that will be chosen
by politicians that do not maximize social welfare but cater to certain interest groups.
We compared the allocations in open and closed economies to the welfare maximizing
allocations and derived some interesting results. While we showed that it is a robust
￿nding that a Nash equilibrium in protection standards does provide less than optimal
protection, we also showed that a politician that favors producers interests over con-
sumers interests will increase world welfare as a whole, but does so at the expense of his
own consumers. Whereas in a closed economy a biased politician is welfare reducing,
this does not have to be true in an open economy.
As in the previous paper, we could show that the strategic interaction between
states can shape their policies and alter them in non-trivial ways. While a biased
politician will always reduce welfare in a closed economy, he can increase world welfare
in an open economy. The result is caused by the double coincidence of two frictions.
On the one hand, there is a positive externality in patent protection that is not fully
17Branstetter et al. (2005) report exactly this ￿nding in a cross-country study. Lai (1998) discusses
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exploited between two sovereign states in a non-cooperative equilibrium. On the other
hand the politician gives di⁄erent weights to di⁄erent groups￿welfare. We could show
in a very simple and robust setting that the two frictions will attenuate each other:
Put di⁄erently, adding the political friction increases e¢ ciency as a whole.Intellectual Property Rights 68
4.7 Appendix
Proof of proposition 2:
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which is the same as above.
Proof of proposition 3a and 3b:
In order to proof this proposition, we proceed in three steps. First, we assume
the existence of an interior equilibrium, taking the results from proposition 4 as given.
Then we ask under which parameter constellations this equilibrium will emerge and
derive cuto⁄ levels for the parameters. In a next step, we show that there is a unique
correspondence between the ranges of the parameters and the equilibrium that will
emerge, i.e. we show that there is always a unique equilibrium.
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Now, we can conclude, if q is neither covered by the correspondence ￿N (￿) nor by
the correspondence ￿S (￿), then it has to be true that tN and tS have to be greater
than zero.
Finally, the correspondences have critical border values for which ful￿ll the weak
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S for all values, it can never happen that more than one equilibrium
will emerge under any parameter constellation.Intellectual Property Rights 70
QED.
Proof of proposition 4:
















Models of Ine¢ cient Economic
PoliciesChapter 5
Rent Seeking, Lobbying and Special
Interest Group Politics
In the ￿nal section of this dissertation we will turn our attention away from ine¢ cien-
cies that arise in open economies and look at issues of e¢ cient governance on a more
abstract level. Political economy arose as a subject when economists tried to identify
frictions in the political process that cause economic policies to go away from opti-
mal outcomes. One reason why this could happen was politicians￿taste for re-election
with uninformed voters, another reason was the in￿ uence special interest groups ex-
ert. There are many di⁄erent ways how special interest groups can in￿ uence policy
outcomes. In chapter 4, we already assumed an objective function of a politician that
made him biased in favor of one group of domestic residents.
In what follows, we want to present two conceptually di⁄erent possibilities how
special interest groups can exert in￿ uence, namely rent seeking and lobbying. Then
we want to stress the di⁄erence between the two approaches with a focus on rent
seeking. Further, we want to discuss a new approach undertaken by Brandauer and
Englmaier (2004). At the end of this chapter we want to have clarity on what models
of rent seeking can explain and what they cannot explain. In the ￿nal chapter of this
dissertation, we present a model that looks on rent seeking as a means of redistribution
in a voting model.Rent Seeking 73
5.1 Lobbying
As already mentioned, one way for special interest groups to in￿ uence political decision
making is lobbying.1 Whereas rent seeking is wasteful, because the channel how to buy
in￿ uence is wasteful, the actual process of lobbying in itself is not wasteful. One can
distinguish two main lines of the lobbying literature: the ￿rst one is lobbying by the
provision of information, the second one is lobbying by donations of money. The ￿rst
type of models involve some uncertainty about the true state of the world. The special
interest group, however, has better information than the policymaker about the true
state of the world, as it is more familiar with a particular policy issue. In this setting of
asymmetric information, the special interest group can use its informational advantage
in order to in￿ uence the chosen policy to its advantage. Typically, these models predict
that this informational advantage of the lobbying group will increase the equilibrium
welfare of the lobby, but at the expense of a decrease in overall welfare relative to
the ￿rst best equilibrium under perfect information. If we compare the situation of
asymmetric information with lobbying to one, where lobbying is not possible, we can
see that lobbying increases welfare in general, but still does not reach the ￿rst best
solution.2 It is in our context important to stress that the channel of in￿ uence, namely
the provision of information, does not cause any ine¢ ciencies. The ine¢ ciencies arise
when the politician decides to choose a policy, even if the politician tries to maximize
social welfare.
If we consider models where lobbyists try to in￿ uence policymakers by donations of
money (sometimes called campaign contribution models), similar considerations apply.
These models assume a politician that wants to maximize social welfare, but at the
same time wants to attract donations. This gives lobby groups the possibility to o⁄er
the politician campaign contributions contingent on the chosen policy. The equilibrium
allocation is jointly e¢ cient for the politician and the interest group and has the nice
property that the politicians behavior can be described as maximizing a weighted sum
of national welfare and special interest group￿ s welfare.3 Again, it is important to stress
that the mode of in￿ uence seeking in itself is not ine¢ cient. The interest groups give a
transfer to the politician who can use the money for his purposes. The ine¢ ciency arises
1A good review of the literature on lobbying can be found in Grossman and Helpman (2001).
2Austen-Smith (1993,1995) developed two classical contributions on that issue. Recent surveys
can be found in Grossman and Helpman (2001) and Austen-Smith (2004).
3This is by the way the microfoundation of the politician￿ s objective function we used in Chapter
4. The politicians objective function that we derived in Chapter 3 as the outcome of a probabilistic
voting behavior can be motivated with this lobbying function as well.Rent Seeking 74
once the politician chooses the policy. This model implicitly assumes that politicians
are no pure welfare maximizers, but also have a taste for campaign contributions.4
5.2 Rent Seeking and Contest Success Functions
The term rent seeking was coined by Tullock (1967) and further developed by Krueger
(1974). Buchanan used the term rent seeking to describe all unproductive activities
that are undertaken in order to earn a return that lies above the market return. If
entrepreneurs develop new products and thereby can earn a return that lies above the
market return, society as a whole will gain by that activity. If entrepreneurs, however,
collude and wastefully spend resources in order to obtain regulations that restrict
competition on a potentially competitive market, then society as a whole will certainly
lose. It is exactly this kind of activity that is called rent seeking. Afterwards some
authors used the term rent seeking in order to describe the e⁄orts undertaken to get a
monopoly position, others used the term to describe an even broader range of activities
in which the political process is used in order to restrict economic e¢ ciency.5 These
activities can include ( but are not limited to) lobbying for customs, restricting access
on markets, lobbying for overly strict quality regulation that discriminate against other
producers or fostering agricultural subsidies. When we talk about the costs of these
ine¢ cient regulations, we must not only talk about the immediate e¢ ciency loss, that
is caused by them, but - as it was Tullock￿ s original insight - we also have to take
into account the expenditures undertaken by lobbyists in order to get their favorable
regulation. If there is an outright bribe for a regulator, this is a pure redistribution
of income and not waste. If one takes into account that lobbyists could do something
productive instead of trying to in￿ uence lawmakers or regulators, then we have to take
all these e⁄orts and expenditures as waste. Tullock also suspected that the e⁄orts in
order to get the favorable regulation could get as big as the rent to be gained. This is
to say all of the rent is wasted in the competition for it. The important di⁄erence to
lobbying models is that the activity of rent seeking in itself is unproductive. Regardless
of the political decision the expenditures that are made are already regarded as waste.
If the policy that is ￿nally chosen is ine¢ cient, the costs of this policy have to be added
4Politicians￿taste for campaign contributions were endogenized by Grossman and Helpman (1996).
We discuss this model in chapter 6.2..Austen-Smith (1987) derived similar conclusions in a probabilistic
voting model.
5See Drazen (2000) p. 335 for a discussion of this issue. For the sake of clarity, Bhagwati (1982)
proposed the term Directly Unproductive Activities.Rent Seeking 75
to ones of the contest. In other words rent seeking is socially costly for two reasons: on
the one hand it implies an ine¢ cient competition, on the other hand the competitors
want to gain something that decreases society￿ s welfare as a whole.6
5.3 Game Theoretic Models of Rent Seeking
Tullock(1980) was the ￿rst one who provided a simple and tractable model of rent
seeking with solid game theoretic foundations. In particular, he assumed that each
participating group could spend an amount of mi in the contest. The probability p
that this group will succeed is given by the so called contest success function, that he







Although Tullock did not provide an explicit microfoundation for this contest suc-
cess function, Skaperdas (1996) showed that this and only this contest success function
could be derived from ￿rst principles. One can obtain insightful solutions, if one as-












6A more subtle point is that more competition among rent seekers never improves welfare, as it is
indeed this competition that is unproductive. Competition among lobbyists can improve welfare under
certain circumstances. If the political decision is one-dimensional and the lobbies are on opposite sides
of the welfare maximizing policy, these e⁄orts will o⁄set each other in equilibrium. Put di⁄erently,
the addition of a second lobby can improve welfare. Note that this is due to the assumption that the
direct transfer of money from the lobbyist to the politician is not wasteful.
Further lobbying models assume that a binding agreement can be signed between the politician
and the lobbying group, whereas rent seeking models assume the opposite, namely that no explicit
contract on the rent can be written.Rent Seeking 76
and total waste D will be given by:
D =
X








@N > 0, the more competition there is ( as measured by an increase in N ),
the more waste will be produced.
As the expenditures for the contest are generally regarded as waste, the public
choice scholars were especially interested in how di⁄erent characteristics of the players
and the technologies will a⁄ect the equilibrium amount of waste. One could show
that more participants caused more waste in general. On the other hand risk aversion
decreases the amount of resources spend in the contest.7 Related to that, one could
￿nd that in the presence of risk aversion wealth e⁄ects in￿ uence the willingness to
spend resources in the contest: the smaller the expenditures in comparison to the total
wealth, the higher the willingness to spend resources in the contest. 8
Nevertheless there are still some open and unexplored questions in the theory of
rent seeking. The ￿rst one concerns the consequences of inter-group heterogeneity.
If rent seeking is undertaken by groups and groups consist of individuals that value
the rent di⁄erently, who will be decisive and will he opt to carry out the contest
himself or will he prefer to delegate to strategically to someone else? This question
is explored by Brandauer and Englmaier (2004) and we will sketch the main results
brie￿ y in the following paragraph.9 Furthermore, we have so far no theoretical model
that looks at the rent seeking contest as a subgame of a bigger game or to speak more
concretely we have no model that looks at rent seeking as part of a political process
where economic agents can vote and engage in rent seeking activities. We propose
a theoretical framework to shed some light on this issue in the last chapter of this
dissertation.
7See Hilman and Katz(1984).
8Baye at al.(1993) provided further insights on a more general level when they looked at rent
seeking contests as a special form of all pay auctions.
9This paper is part of thie dissertation of Florian Englmaier.Rent Seeking 77
5.4 A Model of Delegation in Contests
In a paper with the same title we recognize that contests often take place between
di⁄erent groups. It seems quite natural that di⁄erent group members value the rent
di⁄erently according to their preferences. If farmers lobby for agricultural subsidies,
the value of the subsidy may be di⁄erent to di⁄erent farmers depending on the actual
structure of their farms. If import competing industries lobby for protection from
foreign imports, similar considerations apply.
We assume that the heterogeneity within a group i can be captured in a single




￿ijR ￿ mi (5.5)
This intra group heterogeneity gives rise to two con￿ icts. On the one hand group
members might wish to spend di⁄erent amounts of resources in the contest. On the
other hand, group members will have to choose one appointee who will carry out the
rent seeking activities. As the appointee will act according to his own preferences once
he is in o¢ ce, this gives rise to a delegation problem.
As the con￿ ict of interest takes place in a one-dimensional policy space ( the amount
of spending), we can show that the individual with the median valuation of the rent
will be decisive. The interesting question is whether he will want to participate in the
contest on his own or wishes to delegate someone with di⁄erent preferences into the
contest.
Although, one can never do better in a non-strategic decision problem by delegating
a decision to someone with preferences di⁄erent to one￿ s own, this might be di⁄erent in
a strategic environment as the choice of a delegate can be regarded as a commitment to
a high or low level of spending. In order to explore the e⁄ects of strategic delegation,
we look at three di⁄erent situations.
First, we look at a situation of one-sided delegation, that is only one group has
the ability to delegate while the other group is stuck with an appointee. We can show
that the delegation decision depends solely on the medians type and the type of the
opponent from the other group. If the median faces someone that values the rent higher
than he does, he will decide to send an appointee into the contest who values the rent
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delegate to someone who is even more radical than he is. If he faces someone who
values the rent as he does, he will decide to act on himself.
Second, if we look at a situation of sequential delegation, the ￿rst moving median
will decide to delegate to someone who values the rent higher than he does. The second
moving median will accompany by delegating to someone who values the rent less than
he does. This result does not depend on whether the ￿rst or the second moving median
is more radical and has a straightforward interpretation: Sending someone radical in
the contest can preempt the opponent, as it serves as a commitment device to spend a
lot. As the opponent is also concerned with the generated waste, he will decrease his
expenditures by sending someone less radical into the contest.
Third, we look at a situation of simultaneous delegation. It turns out that the
more radical median will delegate to the most radical type available, whereas the other
median will delegate to someone less radical. This e⁄ect of extreme polarization is
independent of the initial di⁄erences in the median￿ s valuation. Put di⁄erently, we
arrive again at a generically asymmetric equilibrium.
Finally, we can show that the equilibria in games of delegated rent seeking imply
generically less waste. Roughly speaking, this is due to the fact that delegation tends
to reinforce initial di⁄erences, which in turn tends to decrease the amount of resources
spent in the contest. Therefore, we can conclude that delegation is desirable from a
social planner￿ s point of view.
5.5 Some Empirical Evidence on the Costs of Rent
Seeking
There is a rich literature that tries to measure the costs of rent seeking activities.10
Although these studies ￿nd in general that the costs of rent seeking are signi￿cant,
the estimated costs vary signi￿cantly from some percentage of GDP up to half of
the GDP depending on the de￿nition of rent seeking. The seminal paper by Krueger
(1974) looked at rent seeking India and Turkey and estimated that 7 percent of the
Turkish GDP are wasted in rent seeking activities. For India she looked at the e⁄ects
of regulations in the trade sector and came up with the surprisingly high number of 15
percent of GDP as wasted in rent seeking contests. The highest number was obtained
10For a recent survey see Mueller(2003). Mueller does not restrict himself to a particular de￿nition
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by Laband and Sophecleus (1988) for the US where they estimated 50 percent of the
GDP as wasted into rent seeking. The high ￿gure is certainly true to their very broad
de￿nition of rent seeking. They include for example all advertising expenditures rent
seeking activities. A recent and prominent contribution by Goldberg and Maggi (1999)
estimated for the US that politicians behavior in trade policy can be described as if
they are willing to exchange one dollar in campaign contributions for 50 dollars in
national welfare.11 This is considerably smaller, but still evidence of the presence of
rent seeking activities.12
So, if there is so much evidence of the presence of welfare reducing rent seeking, it is
natural to ask, why is it not eliminated in democracies?13 If politicians and bureaucrats
can get exchanged, why do voters not get rid of politicians that tolerate rent seeking
contest or even foster their emergence? We turn to that issue in the next paper where
we combine the contest success function model of rent seeking that abstracts from all
institutional details with an equally institution free model of voting. We will show that
even in this institution free world we can show that rent seeking activities will emerge
as an equilibrium outcome of the interaction between voters and politicians.
11They do not estimate a contest model of rent seeking, but a model of lobbying that was proposed
by Grossman and Helpman(1994) and is based on a menue auction, not a contest success function.
12One should not take these numbers too literally, as it is a matter of de￿nition what activities are
unproductive. An activity can only be quali￿ed as unproductive, if one can be sure that the same
means can be used for something productive. As Tollison(1996) puts it: "To argue that one can be
wealthier without locks and lawyers implies that there are fesaible reforms in behavior that will reduce
such costs. ...The lock and the lawyer are only wasteful to the extent that these ressources can be
feasibly reallocated to more productive ueses." (p. 514)
13Austen-Smith(1991) raised the same question in the context of trade policy. If individuals are
rational enough to make a "correct" consumption choice, why are they not able to stop ine¢ cient
trade policies.Chapter 6
Rent Seeking and Electoral
Accountability
6.1 Introduction
Rent seeking received a lot of attention by economists. Following Tullock￿ s seminal
contribution (1980) a rich literature emerged that tried to characterize equilibria in rent
seeking contests and identi￿ed how di⁄erent characteristics of the players will a⁄ect
the equilibrium amount of resources spent in the rent seeking contest. No attention,
however, was paid to politicians￿incentives to create rents di⁄erent groups of society
compete for. In general, there has to be someone, for example a politician, who decides
whether to give certain rents or suppress their creation. In many cases a politician has
various possibilities to in￿ uence the size of the rent. Nevertheless, rent seeking parts of
society as well as non-rent seeking parts have the possibility to vote and in particular
they have the possibility to vote rent creating politicians out of o¢ ce. This paper
studies the interaction of politicians￿incentives to create rents and voters￿incentives to
vote for rent creating politicians and to engage in rent seeking contests. In other words,
the aim of this paper is to study the endogenous emergence of rents in democracies.1
The previous section presented already ample evidence that there are a lot of rent
seeking activities going on in democracies. At the same time, however, there is the
claim that electoral accountability leads to cleaner forms of government. While the
public discussion is rather focussed on corruption, rent seeking activities should be
taken into account as well. Whereas corruption is de￿ned as illegal and therefore has
1Throughout the paper we use the terms democracy and electoral accountability synonymously.Rent Seeking and Electoral Accountability 81
to take place in an environment of imperfect observability, rent seeking activities are
not illegal and can be observed to a large degree. Still, there is no doubt that systems
of governance should be designed as to avoid the emergence of rent seeking activities.
Therefore this paper asks under which conditions democratic governance can eliminate
wasteful rent seeking activities.
This paper looks at a institution free world. We take a policy space in which the
median voter is decisive, so that we do not have to specify special voting procedures.
Furthermore, we describe the rent seeking activities with a simple contest success func-
tion and do not go institutional details. This abstraction allows us to see clearly what
characteristics of the population will lead to the emergence of rent seeking contests.
Certainly, this clarity comes at the price of a lack of institutional details. This implies
in particular that we cannot say anything about which institutional characteristics will
make the emergence of rent seeking contests likely. However, we show that electoral
accountability provides indeed the right incentives for politicians not to create rent
seeking contests in their economies. At the same time, the paper also shows that there
are circumstances under which these incentives are not strong enough and even in
democracies under perfect observability politicians will be able to get into o¢ ce that
are inclined to give away rents in contests. This can happen as rent seeking contests can
be used as a means of redistributive policy (although a very ine¢ cient one). If there are
large asymmetries in the cost sharing of the rents which can be created, this will un-
ambiguously increase politicians￿incentives to create rent seeking contests. Although
all voters are perfectly aware of the fact that rent seeking contests are a particular in-
e¢ cient instrument of redistributive policy, they can be an equilibrium outcome of the
interaction between voters and politicians. Further we show that more vested interests
in society decrease voters incentives to vote for rent creating politicians. This seems
surprising since rent seeking models that do not account for the endogeneity of the rent
creating process predict the opposite. The more players are involved in a rent seeking
contest, the more resources will be spent in the contest, i. e. the larger the produced
waste. We show that the anticipation of this waste will reduce voters incentives to vote
for rent creating politicians ex-ante. While we certainly do not want to claim these
classical results are wrong, we provide some caveats for their applicability. Once we
consider the possibility that voters control the creation of rents indirectly through the
voting mechanism, their incentives are altered in a non-trivial way. This result might
explain why democracies seem to enjoy cleaner forms of governance.
In Section 6.2 we will relate this chapter to the existing literature; then we will
present the model and the time structure in 6.3 and 6.4.. In the following section 6.5Rent Seeking and Electoral Accountability 82
we consider two asymmetric groups that engage in the rent seeking contest and brie￿ y
discuss issues of time consistent behavior. Finally in 6.6, we look at A groups but
restrict the dimension of heterogeneity to one. Then we do some insightful comparative
statics on the number of groups. We conclude in section 6.7.
6.2 Related literature
As already mentioned in Chapter 5, there is a rich empirical literature that shows
that rent seeking activities are indeed more than a theoretical possibility, but cause a
signi￿cant welfare loss to economies. From a theoretical point of view, there are few
papers that look at the emergence of rent creating behavior in the political process. It
is certainly true that politicians can create rents and give them away in contests. Still,
if rent seeking activities are clearly ine¢ cient, one should ask why voters do not make
use of the voting mechanism to suppress the rent creating behavior of politicians.
One of the ￿rst papers that deals with this issue is the seminal paper by Peltzman
(1976). Peltzman looks at a regulated industry where a politician can set a price.
Naturally consumers want the price to be as low as possible, whereas producers want
the price to be as close to the monopoly price as possible. Although Peltzman does
not formulate an explicit model of voting, he assumes that the politicians￿behavior
can be captured in an objective function that approximates his taste for reelection and
campaign contributions. Peltzman then shows that the politician will choose a price
between the competitive market price and the monopoly price. The politician faces
a trade-o⁄: on the one hand he wants to attract as much campaign contributions as
possible (by setting a high price), on the other hand he wants to get as much consumer￿ s
votes as possible (by setting a low price). His optimal choice is an interior solution
that sets the price somewhere between the monopoly price and the competitive price.
Baye et al.(1993) go one step further and calculate the maximum revenue a gov-
ernment can obtain in the rent creating process, but they still do not consider that a
government is chosen by voters, and that voters have the possibility to control the rent
creating process on this stage already. Finally, Hilman and Ursprung (2000) ask under
which conditions rent seeking activities will lead to the economic decline of a nation.
There is also a large literature that deals with lobbying as a part of the political
process. This is in particular true, once one wants to look at the interaction of lobbying
and voting. Grossman and Helpman (1996) formalize this in a model with a re-electionRent Seeking and Electoral Accountability 83
seeking politician, informed voters, impressionable voters and lobbies. The politicians￿
only desire is to get re-elected, informed voters know the policy that maximizes social
welfare, whereas impressionable voters do not. They can however be persuaded by
non-informative, but costly campaign adds. In order to pay for these adds, politicians
need campaign contributions by lobbies that can o⁄er contributions contingent on
certain policies being enacted. In equilibrium, a policy will be chosen that does not
maximize social welfare, but the joint welfare of politician and interest group and the
politician will collect a positive amount of campaign contributions. This paper follows
Grossman and Helpman by specifying a voting procedure as well, but describes the
socially wasteful activity as rent seeking, not as lobbying.
6.3 The Model
Let us consider the following three stage game. In period one voters elect a politician
and voters can observe how e¢ cient the politician is in collecting resources that are
spent in the rent seeking contests and how much he is willing to do so. Then the
politician sets the size of the rent by maximizing his objective function. Finally di⁄erent
parts of societies decide, if they want to participate in the rent seeking contest and what
amount of resources they want to spent in the contest. Let us now ￿rst describe the
politician￿ s behavior, then we turn to the rent seeking groups.










The ￿rst term captures the sum of all resources m, that are spent in the rent seeking
contest by the contestants. We allow for the possibility that the politician is not able
to appropriate all of them, but only a fraction ￿, with 0 < ￿ ￿ 1. Of course, the
absolute amount of resources spent in the contest will depend on the chosen size of
the rent R.2 The rent however does not only generates revenue, it also causes some
2From a theoretical point of view, one may ask why we do not allow for the politician to choose
the optimal mechanism to extract revenues from the economy. It is easy to see that the e¢ cient
mechanism would be an English auction in this case. However, this critique applies to all of the rent
seeking literature. It is probably more di¢ cult or even illegal to give rents away in auctions. Still,
Ekelund and Tollison(1981) interpret mercantilism exactly like that. Another discussion of e¢ cientRent Seeking and Electoral Accountability 84
convex costs, which we assume to be quadratic. This captures the distortion created
by the rent, which includes the immediate e¢ ciency loss as well as the induced rent
seeking behavior of other members of the same society. Politicians di⁄er with respect
to the importance they attach to the allocative costs of the rent and we assume that
this parameter is observable by voters. Therefore a politician￿ s type will be given by a
and consequently voting takes place over a. A politician with a high a does not care a
lot about the distortions created by the rent and is inclined to create rather high rents.
If a approaches 0, the politician will put an in￿nitely high weight on the costs of the
rent and refrain from the creation of rents.
Turning to the rent seekers we assume that society consists of groups that partic-
ipate in the rent seeking contest and one group that contains all individuals that do
not participate in the rent seeking contest in any form. We do not discuss why some
individuals are able to form groups while others are not.3 Furthermore, we assume
in the ￿rst part of the paper that groups are able to overcome the free-rider problem
within the group, that means the group can collect the amount of resources spent in
the contest in the form of equal contributions by all members. In what follows, we will
￿rst look at a good that is a private good for the group as a whole, then we will look
at a rent that can be considered as a group speci￿c public good. In the case of the rent









An individual group member￿ s utility is given by the probability pi (m￿i;mi) that his
own group wins the rent which is of course a function of his own group￿ s contributions
and the other group￿ s contributions. i denotes the group speci￿c characteristics. We
allow for the possibility that di⁄erent groups value the rent di⁄erently and capture
this heterogeneity in the group speci￿c parameter ￿i. We have to subtract from this
expected revenue the resources the group spends in the contest mi. Furthermore, the
rent creates some distributive costs that are linear and capture the opportunity costs
of the rent. Groups di⁄er in the degree they participate in the costs by a group-speci￿c
parameter ￿i. Note that
P
￿i ￿ 1 is a su¢ cient condition for rent seeking to be
ine¢ cient for the economy as a whole. Of course, groups also face the allocative costs
of the rent, that we captured in the last quadratic term. As the above utility function
transfers in poliuical economy can be found in Rodrik(1995), who discusses this issue at the example
of trade policy.
3Olson(1965) is the classic reference on this issue.Rent Seeking and Electoral Accountability 85
describes individual and not group utility, the term in brackets is divided by the number
of group members ni.
Next, we have to be more speci￿c about the contest success function pi (mi;m￿i).

















If an individual does not belong to a group that participates in the rent seeking contest,









Obviously, this individual will not participate in the gains of the contest, but only in
the costs and it is easy to see that this individual will never want any rent seeking
contests to emerge. Note also that,
@ui
@R = 0 for one and only one R and
@2ui
@R2 < 0 for
all R. Therefore preferences are single-peaked. This implies in particular, that in any
voting process over R or any variable x = x￿1 (R) with @x
@R > 0 or @x
@R < 0 for all R, the
median agent will be decisive.4
Before we proceed to the analysis, we introduce the individual objective function
for the case of the rent as a public good as well. It will be given by:
ui = pi (m￿i;mi)￿iR ￿
1
ni





The only di⁄erence in this objective function and the objective function in the private
goods case lies in the expected gains of the rent: they do not have to be divided by the
number of group members, but can be enjoyed by all group members simultaneously.
In what follows, we look at the following three stage game. In period 1, voters
will have the possibility to elect a politician. Since we assume perfect observability
throughout the model, the election is essentially a choice of the politicians type a. In
other words, voters are fully aware of the type of politician they elect.
4The propensity to create rent seeking contests ful￿lls the conditions made on x.Rent Seeking and Electoral Accountability 86
In period 2, the politician in￿ uences the size of the rent di⁄erent fractions in society
compete for. He does so by maximizing his objective function over R.
Finally, in period 3, di⁄erent fractions of society compete for the rent that can be
gained in an ordinary Tullock style rent seeking contest by choosing an amount of m.
6.4 Two Asymmetric Rent Seeking Groups
6.4.1 The Rent as a Private Good
As it is in particular interesting to analyze how di⁄erent characteristics or di⁄erent
numbers of groups in￿ uence the equilibrium amount of rent seeking in an economy, we
want to study both e⁄ects in isolation to show their e⁄ects in a more pronounced way.
First of all, we want to consider the case of asymmetric groups. In order to keep the
analysis as simple as possible, we restrict ourselves to two groups, that we denote 1 and
2 respectively. This means society is partitioned in a way such that among all groups
only two will participate in the rent seeking contest. We do not restrict the number of
all individual players that can form a group. This will be of some importance once we
are in a position to analyze the voting process. Further we assume that all groups are
su¢ ciently well organized, such that the group is able to collect the optimal amount of
rent seeking resources from its members, i. e. the group is able to solve the free rider
problem perfectly. In what follows, we will ￿rst look at a rent that is a private good,
i.e. group members have to share the rent among themselves. Then we will consider
the case where the rent is a group speci￿c public good. In the case of a private good


















otherwise. In order to determine the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, we
proceed by backward induction. Note that on the third stage of the game both groupsRent Seeking and Electoral Accountability 87
only decide about how much to invest in the rent seeking contest. As the size of the
rent is already set, the cost are also given. Therefore the group￿ s reduced maximization




￿1R ￿ m1 (6.9)




￿2R ￿ m2 (6.10)
If both groups, one and two, maximize their objective functions, this yields the
following ￿rst order conditions.
m2
(m1 + m2)
2￿1R ￿ 1 = 0 (6.11)
for group 1. And
m1
(m1 + m2)
2￿2R ￿ 1 = 0 (6.12)
for group 2. These two equations implicitly de￿ne two reaction functions.Solving this
system of two equations, gives us the following equilibrium values of m1 and m2.
m1 =
￿1￿2
(￿1 + ￿2)2￿1R (6.13)
for group 1. And similarly for group 2:
m2 =
￿1￿2
(￿1 + ￿2)2￿2R (6.14)
Note that the optimal amount of resources spent in the contest is independent of
the cost share. This is due to the fact that ￿ghting for the rent does not in￿ uence the
size of the rent. Further, the group￿ s expenditures are proportional to the valuation.
Note also that the amount of resources the group as a whole spends is independent of
the number of its members. As the good is a private - and therefore rival - good, m
is chosen in a way that maximizes the whole groups￿expected pro￿t of the contest.
Since there are no distribution costs within the group, there is exactly one m, thatRent Seeking and Electoral Accountability 88
maximizes the group￿ s expected pro￿t independent of the number of its members.
This result obviously depends on the assumption that the group is able to solve its
free rider problem. Since we assume perfect information on all stages of the game, the
politician who is to move on stage two of the game can perfectly predict the amount
of rent seeking expenditures that are induced by a certain size of the rent. This allows
him to calculate his expected revenues:
￿ (m1 (R) + m2 (R)) (6.15)
Taking into account that the rent will also create some distortions his maximization
problem can be stated as:












which has as a unique solution:
R




This function maps the politician￿ s type into the rent size, taking the characteristics
of the rent seeking groups as given. One can see what determines the politicians
taste for creating rent seeking contests. On the one hand it depends on his own
characteristics: The more able he is in extracting bribes from the rent seeking groups
and the less he values distortions created by the rent, the higher he will set the rent. On
the other hand the rent seekers characteristics will also in￿ uence the size of the rent.
Two factors determine the size: ￿rst it is the absolute valuation of both players, but
at the same time it is also the relative valuation. Roughly speaking, the politician can
extract more rents from two groups that value the rent by the same amount than from
two very asymmetric players. This in turn will deliver a unique relationship between
the elected politicians type and the rent seekers￿payo⁄ , which can be expressed as a
function ui(a j ￿i;￿i;￿j;￿j):In other words, we have a unique relationship between the
politicians type and the individual payo⁄in equilibrium, given one￿ s own characteristic
and the characteristics of one￿ s opponent.
u1(a j ￿1;￿1;￿2;￿2;￿) =
1
n1
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As one can easily see, the utility function of an individual whose group partici-
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Next we have to specify the optimal voting decision, for negative maximands of the
above equation. We do so in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Individual preferences are single peaked with respect to a, there-






























As ui is quadratic and therefore single-peaked with respect to a, the me-
dian voter will be decisive.Rent Seeking and Electoral Accountability 90
A proof can be found in the appendix. Naturally, groups that do not participate
will never vote for a politician that will create rents, i. their preferred choice of a is
a￿ = 0.
If groups participate in the rent seeking contest, it is easy to see that the individually
optimal choice of a has the following properties:
@a￿
1
@￿1 > 0 for ￿2 > 1
2
The higher ones own valuation of the rent, the more inclined one is to vote for a
politician that is corrupt and will indeed create rents. A su¢ cient condition for this





If one faces an opponent group however, that values the rent highly, one￿ s incentives
to vote for politicians￿with a high propensity to create contests decrease as one knows




The higher the share of the costs created by the rent that one has to bear, the




The more e¢ cient politicians are in collecting the resources that are spent in the
contest, the higher voter￿ s incentives to vote for a politician that takes care of the
costs of the rent seeking activities. If a politician is e¢ cient in appropriating rent
seeking resources, this makes the contest relatively cheap for him and he wants to create
comparatively bigger rents. Rational voters anticipate that in their voting decision.
Note also that ￿ does not in￿ uence the decision whether one wants rent seeking contests
or not, but it in￿ uences merely their size.Rent Seeking and Electoral Accountability 91
The same properties hold vice versa for a￿
2 as well.It is easy to see that players that
will not participate in the rent seeking contest will have an optimal a of zero as they
cannot participate in the contest, but have to bear some of its costs.





of each member of society, a rent R(a;￿1;￿2) and resources
spent in rent seeking m1 (R;￿1;￿2)and m2 (R;￿1;￿2):
Note that this is not a full characterization of the equilibrium, as it only de￿nes the
optimal decision rules depending on the games fundamentals, i. e. the characteristics
of the players. In order to specify which politician will get elected we have to be more
explicit about the majorities in society. We will distinguish two cases. As preferences
are quadratic with respect to a the median agent of the population will be decisive.
In order to determine what type of politician will get elected, one has to determine
the median voters group. If the median voter belongs to the group that does not
gain from rent seeking, voting will indeed bring a politician into o¢ ce who will not
create rent seeking contests. Otherwise, the median voter decides over the degree of
corruption. Let us now for notational reasons and without loss of generality assume,
that the median voter lies in group 2. Therefore we can summarize our ￿ndings in the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 Proposition 2 ·The median voter will elect a politician of
type a, such that a￿
med=max[( 1
￿1￿med￿￿2





























In particular, this implies the following: If the non-rent seeking groups have a ma-
jority in society, simple majority voting will not bring a rent creating politician into
o¢ ce. As these groups will only participate in the costs of, but not in the gains from the
rent seeking contest, they will never vote for the emergence of a rent seeking contest.
If the median lies in one of the two groups that might bene￿t from the emergence of
rent seeking contests, he might choose a positive a. Note that this does not imply that
he will do so necessarily. His optimal decision depends on his own and his opponentsRent Seeking and Electoral Accountability 92
characteristics. The comparative statics are the same as above, for all points where the
optimal decision of the median voter is di⁄erentiable.
Next, we want to see, if there are conditions, under which no group will vote for
a politician that is known to create rents. If we can identify such conditions, this
will allow us to make an even stronger statement about the emergence of rent seeking
contests in the economy, since our results will no longer depend on the applicability of
the median voter theorem.
Neither members of group 1 nor members of group two will gain from voting for a

























for group 2.A Remark on Time InconsistencyIt is worth mentioning that there might
be situations in which a group ex ante will be against all rent seeking contests, i.e.
p(mi;m￿i)￿iR(a) ￿ mi ￿ ￿iR(a) ￿ R(a)
2is maximized by a = 0. But ex-post it will
be willing to participate in the contest. This is true for all ￿i, that ful￿ll the following
inequalities at the same time.
￿
2





(ex-ante against the contest)
￿i ￿ 0 (6.24)
(ex-post willing to participate)
Once there is a rent creating politician in o¢ ce, the group will nevertheless partici-
pate in the rent seeking contest. Since the group can no longer avoid the creation of the
rent and the costs associated with it, the best it can do is to participate in the context
and thereby trying to capture some of the gains from the rent. This shows the possi-
bility that groups which are ex-ante against the creation of any rents might be driven
(i.e. after the election of a rent creating politician) into rent seeking contests. As weRent Seeking and Electoral Accountability 93
assumed majority voting, rent seeking contests will only emerge, if already ex-ante a
majority of voters wants that to happen. Still, even in this case the majority of agents
willing to participate in the rent seeking contest might further increase. This under-
lies again the crucial role of electoral accountability in trying to prevent rent seeking
activities in an economy. The above mentioned problem might even be more severe, if
the political process is better described in other forms, where also minorities have the
possibility to bring their favored politician into power. Under these circumstances, a
minority of the society might force larger parts into rent seeking behavior.
6.4.2 The Rent as a Group Speci￿c Public Good
Next we want to analyze what happens, if the rent is not a private, but a group
speci￿c public good, that can be consumed by all group member without rivalry in
consumption. As already mentioned, the individual utility function will take on the
following form:
ui = p(mi;m￿i)￿iR ￿
1
Ni

































This yields the following optimal expenditures spent in the contest:
m1 =
￿1￿2N1N2
(￿1N1 + ￿2N2)2￿1N1R (6.28)
m2 =
￿1￿2N1N2
(￿1N1 + ￿2N2)2￿2N2R (6.29)Rent Seeking and Electoral Accountability 94
In contrast to the previous case of rents with private good nature, group size matters
in the case of rents as group speci￿c public goods. It in￿ uences the optimal expenditures
in the same way as the group speci￿c valuation does.On stage two the politician again
maximizes:


















Turning to the ￿rst stage of the game and plugging R into the individual utility
function, voters of group 1 have to choose an a￿
1, that maximizes the following function:

























































Let us now again assume that the median lies in group 2, then we can summarize our
￿ndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If the rent is a public good, the median voter will be decisive





2￿￿2 (￿1N1 + ￿2N2)￿
￿1￿2N1N2
￿1N1+N2￿2);0]
It is noteworthy, that the question whether the rent has the character of a public
or a private good does not a⁄ect whether there will be rent seeking contests or not onRent Seeking and Electoral Accountability 95
stage three. It only in￿ uences the absolute size of the rent. Note however, that the
public good character can increase or decrease the equilibrium size of the rent.
6.5 n Symmetric Groups
6.5.1 The Rent as a Private Good
In order to keep the analysis tractable, we restrict the groups￿ asymmetry to one
form, namely di⁄erences in the cost participation ￿i. But we assume that ni = n
and normalize ￿i = 1 for all groups. Furthermore, we denote the total number of
groups with A. Therefore we still can consider non-heterogeneous groups, but avoid
the problems of multiple equilibria that can arise with A > 2 players and heterogenous
valuations of the rent or unequal group sizes. Again, we will ￿rst have a look at a rent












We will consider the same setting with three periods: in a ￿rst period, each group
is allowed to vote for a politician with a known and observable type parameter a. Once
in o¢ ce, the politician endogenously determines the size of the rent. Afterwards, all A
groups engage in a rent seeking contest, where each group decides how many resources
to spend in the contest. Again we solve the game by backward induction. The optimal














Although players are heterogenous in their cost sharing of the rent, they will spend
the same amount of resources in the rent seeking contest. This is due to the fact that
the size of the rent is already ￿xed at this stage of the game. Nevertheless, at theRent Seeking and Electoral Accountability 96
￿rst stage of the game, which can be interpreted as a voting over the size of the rent,
heterogeneity of the agents will matter crucially.
In stage two, the elected politician maximizes the amount of resources he can extract
from the rent seeking parties, but will also take into account the distortions created by





















This gives us a direct relation between the politicians type and the rent he will




This means the more fragmented society is, the higher he will set the rent. The
result corresponds to what economic intuition predicts: Consider a rent of a given
size. The distortion costs will not be in￿ uenced by the number of groups that will
eventually compete for the rent (This is not true for the distributive costs, which are
not paid by the politician). As competition for the rent gets more ￿erce as the number
of rent seekers increases this will indeed lead to more resources spent in the contest
and therefore vice versa more rent extraction of the rent setting politician. As in
the previous case, the product of rent extracting capability and distortion valuation




Again, we have the property that rent seeking contests are relatively cheap for
e¢ cient politicians.
In the ￿rst stage of the game, voters will have to decide about their preferred type




























as preferences are quadratic with respect to a,the median agent will be decisive













This implies the following proposition:
Proposition 4 If all groups participate equally in the costs of the rent, no
group will favor the emergence of rent seeking contests in the economy.
Proof: If all groups participate equally, ￿i = 1
A for all i. Then the optimal a￿ will
be zero for all groups.
The equilibrium level of rent seeking activities and therefore the equilibrium size
of the rent will be determined by the median voters ￿i: As one can see, rent seeking
contests will only emerge in an economy as the result of interaction between voters
and politicians, if there is some asymmetry in the costs. Roughly speaking, only if the
median group participates to a lesser extent in the costs of the rent seeking contest
than the average citizen, one can expect rents as the outcome of an interaction between
voters and politicians.
Proposition 5 If ￿
med < 1
A2;the median voter will gain from the emergence
of rent seeking contests in equilibrium. The equilibrium can be characterized
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The proofs can be found in the appendix. It is interesting to look at the comparative
statics of this result. Taking the derivative of a￿

















The more competition the decisive median voter expects in the rent seeking contest,
the less he will be inclined to vote for politicians that are known to create rents. As
the expected gains from rent seeking decrease in the number of competitors, whereas
the costs stay the same, rent seeking contests become a less and less attractive means
of redistribution, as the number of potential competitors increases.
If we look at the equilibrium amount of rent created by the politician, we can see
that it also decreases in A, i.e. @R
@A < 0. Although a given politician will always prefer
more competitors to less in the rent seeking contest, the equilibrium size of the rent
will be smaller, the more competitors there are. The reason is closely related to the
one above. As voters know their expected payo⁄ from the rent seeking contest will
decrease in the number of competitive groups, they have incentives to vote for less rent
creating politicians. In other words, this result is due to the fact that voters rationally
anticipate that more competition will lead to more waste.
Finally, one can see that @D
@A < 0, i.e. the total amount of waste created in the rent
seeking contest will also decrease in the number of di⁄erent groups. This is again due
to the fact that rational voters try to limit the amount of rent and waste as they know
the wasteful e⁄ects of ￿ercer competition in the last stage of the game.
Proposition 4 deserves some attention as it seems to run contrary to the common
sense argument that more fractionalized societies seem to have less clean forms of
governance. Further it seems to be at odds with the traditional conclusion that rent
seeking turns out to be more wasteful, the more groups are involved. Once one allows
for the possibility that rent seekers can in￿ uence the size of the rent by voting for
politicians that are more or less inclined to create these rents, the traditional conclusion
is overturned: if people anticipate rationally that more competition will induce more
waste, their incentives to increase the amount of rents they compete for will decrease
in equilibrium. Put di⁄erently, the result does not overturn the classical result, but
shows, that once one looks at the equilibrium of a larger game, the lower expected
pro￿t of more competition for each competitor will reduce the size of the rent ex-
ante. The anticipation of wasteful competition will reduce the size of the rent in the
subgame-perfect equilibrium.Rent Seeking and Electoral Accountability 99
6.5.2 The Rent as a Group Speci￿c Public Good
Let us ￿nally analyze the case of n groups and a rent that has the character of a group
speci￿c public good. We will restrict ourselves to the case of A symmetric groups, i. e.











2 ￿ mi) (6.44)
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for all i groups. In contrast to the case of private goods, the group size matters
again, which is simply due to the fact that the rent has a value of N times R.





which is N times bigger as in the previous case as well.













Let us summarize these ￿ndings in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 If ￿
med < 1
A2;the median voter will gain from the emergence
of rent seeking contests in equilibrium. The equilibrium can be characterized













5Again we make this assumption in order to avoid issues of multiple equilibria.Rent Seeking and Electoral Accountability 100








Again the median voter is decisive. And we see the familiar result that the public
good character of the rent in￿ uences the size of the rent, but not the principal decision
whether there will be rent seeking contests in the economy or not.
From a normative point it is interesting to ask whether a partition of society in
many small groups or a partition in only a few groups will generate more waste. If one
looks at the rent seeking contest in isolation, one would predict that more competitors
will generate more waste, therefore it is preferable to have less competitors, whereas
the present framework showed that this does not have to be the case. In order to
answer this question, let us de￿ne the whole size of the population with P, such that






























If the group size changes the cost share of each individual group might change as




with 0 < c < 1 and ￿ < 0.
If ￿ = ￿1, cost decreases inversely proportional to group size. Now we can rewrite





















c(A￿ + A￿+1 ￿ A￿+2) ￿ A
A5 < 0 (6.52)
for all ￿ < 0 and A ￿ 2.Rent Seeking and Electoral Accountability 101
Now, we can derive proposition 6 .
Proposition 7 If the costs a group has to bear decrease in the number of
groups, a larger number of groups will reduce the equilibrium amount of
waste. In particular, if the costs decrease inversely proportional, a larger
number of groups will reduce the equilibrium amount of waste.
Inversely proportional decreasing costs implies, that
P
￿i stays constant for a any
number of groups. Again we can see, that anticipated ￿ercer competition (larger num-
ber of groups), will reduce the incentives to create rent seeking contests ex-ante. Nev-
ertheless this result is far from being obvious, as the total value of the rent to all agents
together does not change by the partition in di⁄erent groups.
6.6 Conclusion
It was Stigler￿ s (1974) brilliant insight to recognize that regulations do not fall from
heaven, but are created by politicians that pursue their own objectives. The idea of
this paper was to go one step further since politicians and bureaucrats do not fall from
heaven either. Politicians at least have to get elected in democracies. The aim of
this paper was to identify circumstances under which rent seeking contests will be the
equilibrium outcome of an interaction between voters and politicians. In other words,
this paper tried to look at rent seeking contests, in which the size of the rent contestants
compete for is an endogenous choice variable. We abstracted from all institutions and
restricted the policy space, such that median voter is decisive in the voting procedure.
Furthermore, we described the rent seeking process with a contest success function.
Nevertheless our approach gave us interesting results: The paper identi￿ed two sources
that will make it likely for rent creating politicians to get into o¢ ce. If the there
are large asymmetries in the bene￿ts and costs of the rents that can be gained, this
will tend to favor the emergence of rent creating politicians. The more the median
voter values the rent and the smaller the degree to which he participates in the costs,
the higher the equilibrium size of the rent. It is not only the high valuation of the
rent itself that will make a group spend a lot in the rent seeking contest, but also the
knowledge of the strategic advantage it will have in the rent seeking contest by being
the higher valuing group. Interestingly, we were able to show that a large number ofRent Seeking and Electoral Accountability 102
groups makes the emergence of rent seeking contests less likely, something that might
be surprising at ￿rst glance, but nevertheless has a plausible interpretation: the more
contestants in the competition for the rent, the smaller the individual expected pro￿t
of the individual rent seeking group. As the costs created by the rent-seeking contest
stay the same, this obviously makes rent seeking less attractive and thereby diminishes
the incentives of all groups to elect rent creating politicians into o¢ ce.Rent Seeking and Electoral Accountability 103
6.7 Appendix
Solution of Subgame 3
ui = 1
Ni(p(mi;m￿i)￿iR ￿ mi ￿ ￿iR ￿ 1
2R2)
is the same as:
ui = p(mi;m￿i)￿iR ￿ mi ￿ ￿iR ￿ 1
2R2 =
m1




(m1+m2)2￿1R ￿ 1 = 0
and
m1







2.a Maximizing over a
Proof of lemma 1:
Preferences as a function of a are:












Preferences are single peaked with respect to a parameter a, if
(1)
@u1(aj￿1;￿1;￿2;￿2)




@2a < 0 for all a
(1) is proven by the solution of the optimization problem. (2) is easily shown:
@2u1(aj￿1;￿1;￿2;￿2)




































A su¢ cient condition for
@a￿
1
@￿1 > 0 is ￿2 > 1









as ￿2 enters positively in the denominator and positive in the numerator.Chapter 7
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